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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
The aim of this work is to assess the relationship between family mobility and 
children’s educational outcomes. 
Family mobility has been chosen consciously because of its broad meaning. The term 
“mobility” in itself encompasses all types of different movements that can occur within a 
household. The whole family can move and change residence, or one or more members of 
the household can move independently. In addition, the movement can be temporary or 
permanent. Mobility is therefore a more general term than migration, and in part it overlaps 
with it. The specific features of the term migration, as it is used in the literature, are that it 
generally refers to a permanent change of residence, and that it usually concerns the 
decision of a single individual, not of the whole family. Also, even if internal migration is a 
relevant phenomenon, in the economic literature migration has become an almost synonym 
of “international migration”, because the phenomenon has become increasingly relevant 
over the years, drawing a growing amount of interest especially in the developed countries 
that have become the recipient of these migration flows. For these reasons, in the present 
work the term mobility has been preferred, so as to encompass a broader range of 
phenomena. 
The two main bodies of economic literature concerning migration have mainly investigated 
the macro effects of migration flows in the receiving labour markets, and the flows and 
effects of migrants’ remittances to their native households. The first economic model of 
individual migration dates back to the work by Harris and Todaro (1970), which analyses 
the individual choice of moving or staying, as determined by the conditions of the labour 
market in the two alternatives.  
In the economic literature, mobility has been studied primarily as an individual decision, in 
strict relation to the labour market. Nonetheless, in developing countries, migration can be a 
household strategy to obtain additional income thanks to remittances, or a strategy to 
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diversify income sources, like an insurance against adverse economic conditions in a 
context characterized by constraints and market failures. More generally, for its effects on 
human capital, mobility has been considered a family investment.
1
  
The first theoretical model to characterize mobility as a family decision is the one by 
Mincer (1978), which models the decision to move in a two-person household. His model 
assumes that each member of the couple obtains different payoffs from the decision to 
move, and that the decision is made if the “family net gain” from moving is positive. 
Mincer’s model, nonetheless, is based on assumptions that are typical of developed 
countries. 
The effects of mobility on children has been addressed in the literature from two different 
points of view. In the context of developed countries, family residential mobility has mostly 
been studied in the fields of psychology and health. In general, residential mobility has 
been found to have negative effects on children’s educational outcomes and on adolescents’ 
behaviour. Scanlon and Devine (2001) review the relevant literature, mainly in the field of 
sociology, which finds mostly negative correlation between moving and children’s welfare. 
On the other hand, these studies attract a lot of criticism because of inherent specification 
problems (Alexander et al., 1995), which have to be taken into account. The overall 
evidence seems mixed, and very context-specific. 
More recent literature has started to address mobility as a family topic, investigating its 
effects on the family members “left behind”. Empirical studies generally find detrimental 
effects on the family left behind by migrants, especially on women and children, who are 
the most vulnerable members of the household. The findings on children’s left behind are 
generally more controversial than the results of studies on remittances, for which there is a 
general agreement that remittances flows have a significant positive impact on child school 
attendance and literacy, especially for girls.
2
  
Literature on left behind women finds mixed results. It seems that the labour supply 
response of women to male migration is driven by the need to replace the migrant man, 
                                                 
1
 See, for example, Klemp et al. (2012) and Konseiga (2007). 
2
 See McKenzie and Rapoport (2006). 
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rather than by a relaxation of the household constraints due to remittances inflows. These 
results are found in Egypt ( Binzel and Assaad, 2011) and in Albania (Mendola and 
Carletto, 2009). In another recent study on women in Egypt, Elbadawy and Roushdy (2010) 
find that empowerment of left behind women seems to be more due to the husband’s 
absence than to a real empowerment and improvement in status. 
 When looking at children’s outcomes, the underlying idea is that parental migration can 
entail negative outcomes for children left behind by one or both parents. The absence of 
parents may entail a psychological cost, and change the decision making power within the 
household. If a household member leaves, intra-household duties and responsibilities 
change and children may be asked to take on their parent duties, and thus they may spend 
less time in school-related activities. Moreover, if one parent is absent, part of the parental 
effort of sending children to school and monitoring them is missing, while the remaining 
parent could be loaded with extra duties. Consequently, parents’ absence can result in 
school dropout or  grades repetition. It is also likely that the decision power shifts to older 
men in the household, less educated and less prone to understand the value and importance 
of human capital, especially for girls (Ginther and Pollak, 2004).  In their study on children 
left behind in Albania, Giannelli and Mangiavacchi (2010) find evidence that father's 
absence negatively influences children's schooling in the long term, increasing the 
probability of dropping out and delaying school progression. They also find that the impact 
is worse for girls than for boys, implying that parents migration can reduce gender equality 
and women’s empowerment in the long term.  
On the other hand, recent studies on Mexico find no compelling evidence of this type of 
negative effects. Antman (2011a, 2011b and 2012), finds evidence that households where a 
father has migrated to the U.S. are more likely to spend more on girls than on boys, and that 
this effect drops once the father returns. However, she finds no evidence of a detrimental 
effect on education. On the contrary, she finds that father’s migration has a positive impact 
on the schooling of young girls, especially if the father migrates when they are younger, 
while it has no impact on boys’ schooling. 
Because of the inherent problems in addressing these topics on an empirical basis, more 
research in this field is needed, and this thesis aims at contributing to this effort. 
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The other strand of literature this work refers to is the literature on human capital 
formation. It is a huge body of literature, that goes as far as Becker’s (1964) and Mincer’s 
(1974) work (and possibly even further back in time). Human capital has become crucial in 
the economic analysis of different types of phenomena and models, and it has been 
analyzed in relation to both economic growth and individual incomes, and more recently as 
a part of children’s welfare.  
The core of the present work relies mostly on two crucial works on human capital. The first 
one is the model developed by Glewwe (2002) that specifically takes into account the 
quality of children’s schooling and it is therefore more suited to analyze developing 
countries, where the quality of the educational system is often one of the major obstacles to 
an effective education. The second reference work is the work by Becker (1975), that links 
household production theory to the human capital theory, linking household resources and 
investments to the educational attainment of children. Becker’s analysis introduces the 
concepts of the “quality of children” and of the household choice between investments in 
human capital of each child and the number of children they have. Becker’s work is 
essential in understanding the importance of family background and decisions in children’s 
educational outcomes.  
As household decisions are a crucial point of human capital investment, household models 
are also a part of the literature the present work stems from. Most of these theoretical 
models assume that the family acts like a unique decision maker, where children are not 
part of the decision-making process, and are subject to their parents’ decisions. More 
recently, household economics theory has evolved in models that consider intra-household 
bargaining, especially between the two main decision-makers. 
3
  
In general, both the empirical and the theoretical literature stress the importance of family’s 
background and decisions for children’s outcomes, especially those stemming from 
decisions concerning education. The understanding of the transmission mechanisms of 
these effects is of crucial importance to better targeting policies aimed at increasing human 
capital and children’s welfare. In addition, much of the most recent literature stresses the 
                                                 
3
 For a review on the topic see Lundberg and Pollak, 1996. 
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importance of early childhood investment, which is more closely related to family 
dynamics and allocations of time and resources than later educational outcomes, that may 
be a result of a more global setting. 
The aim of the present work is to link these three main strands of literature (migration, 
human capital and family decision mechanisms) in the same conceptual framework, if not 
with a comprehensive theoretical model. As mobility and children’s education are both 
family decisions, and mobility can affect education itself, then it seems logical to analyze 
the two phenomena trying to take into account a broader framework and trying to assess the 
existing links. In this respect, the household economics framework serves as a theoretical 
background to construct the empirical analysis to address the effects of mobility on 
children’s outcomes. 
This work is organized in three papers, which can stand alone, but are conceptually linked 
together in the framework just discussed. 
The first paper reviews the relevant literature in the three fields of research mentioned in 
this introduction. It first reviews the  theme of education in the economic literature, with an 
emphasis on economic growth and individual earnings. It then presents the research on 
family decisions and children’s education, both empirical and theoretical. Then, the paper 
discusses three models of human capital accumulation: the one by Glewwe (2002), the one 
by Hanushek and Woessmann (2008) which is derived from Glewwe’s, and finally, the one 
by Heckman (2007), which is based on the capability approach and models the 
accumulation of a person’s human capital over time. The last part of the paper presents the 
relevant literature on mobility and migration, stressing in particular the findings on 
children’s educational outcomes.  
The second and third papers are empirical case-studies for Egypt and Uganda. 
The second paper analyzes the effects of fathers’ absence on children's education in Egypt. 
The empirical analysis on the grades of schooling achieved by children has been conducted 
using data drawn from the Egypt Labor Market Panel surveys of 1998 and 2006.
4
 The use 
                                                 
4
 Economic Research Forum, Cairo. Data from the third wave have been published in November 2013. 
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of panel data has allowed to overcome part of the endogeneity problems due to 
unobservable or omitted variables (the individual fixed effects). The analysis has been 
carried out estimating both fixed and random effects models for ordered dependent 
variables, such as school grades. The results show that the absence of the father has indeed 
a detrimental effect on children’s schooling, especially at lower levels of education, and are 
robust to the different model specifications. 
The third paper investigates the effects of family mobility on children’s primary school 
attendance in Uganda, using data from the Uganda National Panel Survey of 2005-06, 
2009-10 and 2010-11.
5
 Panel data where used here for the same reasons as in the second 
paper. The empirical strategy has consisted in estimating a household-level model, using 
household ratios. Mobility has been addressed with two dummy variables which proxy past 
mobility of household members. They take value one if at least a child or an adult, 
respectively, has moved from the household in the past five years. The use of this “lagged” 
information has the advantage of reducing the endogeneity problems connected to mobility 
decisions. The results show  that children’s school attendance is improved in households 
where children have moved, while it decreases in households where  adults have moved. 
These results are in line with previous literature and coherent in a context such as Uganda, 
where children may be moving in order to reach areas with better services. The same results 
don’t hold for school completion (neither mobility of adults, nor mobility of children have 
significant effects on school attendance), which points to problems of school quality. A 
multilevel analysis, added as a robustness check, confirms these findings. Significant 
results mirroring the ones for schooling are found for “idle” children, i.e. children who 
don’t go to school neither work. Mobility has effects on time spent doing nothing (neither 
going to school nor working), in that the mobility of children reduces the probability of 
children doing nothing, while the mobility of adults rises it. These results, combined with 
the lack of significant results for child labour, hint that the actual problem opposing 
children’s education is “idleness”, not child labour. 
This thesis adds to the literature in several ways. Using newly available panel data, it 
enhances the  empirical research investigating mobility and education in two countries for 
                                                 
5
 The survey is a part of the Living Standards Measurement Surveys project of the World Bank. 
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which, to the author’s knowledge, there was no previous empirical research on this topic. It 
assesses the effects of mobility in two different, but complementary, ways. In the case of 
Egypt, it addresses the effect of present mobility (e.g. father’s absence), while, in the case 
of Uganda, it investigates family mobility in a more general and original way addressing 
past residential mobility of family members. Last but not least, it tries to set a conceptual 
framework, linking together three different strands of economic literature, and establishing 
a framework for further empirical and theoretical research. 
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Chapter 2 
The Economics of Children's Education 
and Family Mobility: a survey 
 
 
 
Abstract: The aim of this review is to present the findings of three strands of literature 
which are usually addressed separately: migration, human capital and family decision 
mechanisms. The purpose is to link them in the same conceptual framework, in order to 
provide a broader benchmark for further research in those areas. This work  first reviews 
the  theme of education in the economic literature, with an emphasis on economic growth 
and individual earnings. It then presents the research on family decisions and children’s 
education, both empirical and theoretical. Then, the paper discusses three models of human 
capital accumulation. Finally, the last part of the paper presents the relevant literature on 
mobility and migration, stressing in particular the findings on children’s educational 
outcomes.  
JEL Classification: D10 I20 J24 O15 
Keywords: Education, Family, Human Capital, Migration, Mobility   
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Introduction 
 
The aim of this review is to present the findings of three strands of literature which 
are usually addressed separately: migration, human capital and family decision 
mechanisms. The purpose is to link them in the same conceptual framework, in order to 
provide a more comprehensive benchmark to approach further research in these areas, and 
especially in the field concerning the effects of mobility on educational outcomes. As 
mobility and children’s education are both family decisions, and mobility can affect 
education itself, then it seems logical to analyze the two phenomena trying to take into 
account a broader framework and trying to assess the existing links. In this respect, the 
household economics framework serves as a theoretical background to construct the 
empirical analysis to address the effects of mobility on children’s outcomes. 
This work reviews the relevant literature in the three fields of research mentioned above. It 
first reviews the  theme of education in the economic literature, with an emphasis on 
economic growth and individual earnings. It then presents the research on family decisions 
and children’s education, both empirical and theoretical. Then, the paper discusses three 
models of human capital accumulation: the one by Glewwe (2002), the one by Hanushek 
and Woessmann (2008) which is derived from Glewwe’s, and finally, the one by Heckman 
(2007), which is based on the capability approach and models the accumulation of a 
person’s human capital over time. The last part of the paper presents the relevant literature 
on mobility and migration, stressing in particular the findings on children’s educational 
outcomes.  
 
1. Why is education important for economics? 
 
Economists and other researchers have been stressing since the sixties the importance of 
education, and the consequent increase in human capital. All the analysis highlight the 
value of improving a country’s human capital and provide the motivation for developing 
countries to invest in enhancing the skills of their population. The effects of education are 
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analyzed for at least three reasons: improvement in personal earnings, social effects, and 
economic growth at the macro level. 
One of the main reasons for focusing the attention on education and schooling at the 
individual level, has been the analysis of the economic returns to different levels of school 
attainment. Following the innovative analysis of human capital
6
 by Mincer (1974), this 
literature considers how investing in different amounts of schooling affects individual 
earnings. Over the past decades, there have been numerous studies investigating this effect. 
The main findings are that, in general, more schooling is associated with higher earnings, 
and that, in general, the highest returns to education are found in developing countries, for 
lower levels of education and for women. 
One critical and much debated point is the actual role of education in personal earnings: 
one crucial point is whether more able people tend to obtain additional schooling because it 
is less costly for them than for less able people. If they do, it is still not clear whether the 
role of education is signalling pre-existing cognitive abilities as suggested by Spence’s 
seminal work (1973), or actually enhancing and creating those abilities and skills. If a 
mixture of the two effects is at play, it is not clear to what extent each one contributes to 
economic returns. An answer to these question is crucial, because the implications for 
public policy are different. If the signalling function of schooling prevails, then publicly 
subsidizing higher grades of school may have regressive effects. 
Also, there is an ongoing debate in the literature on how to measure returns to education: 
the question is far from trivial, as there are all kinds of possible endogeneity issues in the 
empirical assessment of schooling effects on private earnings. The differences in data 
availability and methods also makes it difficult to compare the results of different studies 
because the method can influence the results, as stated by Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 
(2004) in their review of the literature. To overcome this difficulties, researchers have 
employed all types of different methods. Harmon, Oosterbeek and Walker’s (2003) review 
of empirical findings and analytical approaches concludes that different methods have an 
impact on the results’ magnitude, but not on the causal effect of education on economic 
returns.  
                                                 
6
 The concept of human capital was first introduced by the classic work of Becker (1964) and Shultz (1963). 
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Aside from economic reasons, the rationale for expanding education to all people lies in the 
arguments of equality of opportunities for all population, and in the presence of social 
returns to education, alongside the private ones. Education is found to have positive effects 
on diminishing crime, on health and fertility (more educated women have fewer but 
qualitative better children), on enhancing democratic participation through the access to 
information. Glaeser, Ponzetto and Shleifer (2007) in their work on the relationship 
between democracy and education, analyze the effects of education on democratic 
participation, and state that a better educated population is related to a better functioning 
democratic system, because education reduces the costs of social participation, thus 
reducing the likelihood of anti-democratic coups and dictatorships. 
Defining and estimating the social returns of education, though, is much harder than 
estimating individual returns. Several attempts have been made during the years, but given 
the difficulty of disentangling pure externalities effects from private ones, the evidence is 
inconclusive. The evidence of direct effects on the labour market is more mixed than the 
previous one on generally positive effects on social aspects such as public health and crime 
rates. Moretti (2004) finds positive evidence of spillover effects of education among 
workers, while Ciccone and Peri (2006) find no evidence of this kind of spillover. They 
argue that what we observe are not externalities but wage changes, and find that the 
mincerian model results in an upward bias of the economic return of education. Acemoglu 
and Angrist (2001), using potentially exogenous changes in schooling due to changes in 
compulsory education law, also find no evidence of this type of education externalities. 
The crucial point here is if private returns to education are higher than social ones: when 
the return is calculated according to the total cost, it seems to be so, at least for higher 
levels of education, which results being heavily subsidized by the public sector 
(Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004). Assessing the extent of private and social returns to 
levels of schooling is an important policy issue when allocating public funds to education. 
More recently Lange and Topel (2006) in their review of empirical and theoretical works 
find that the evidence supporting a higher private rate of return is very little, and, given the 
difficulties in assessing this type of effects, there are various reasons to believe the social 
return to education can actually be higher than the private one. 
18 
 
The third and perhaps more important reason economists are concerned with education and 
schooling, is its impact on economic growth. Analysis of the link between education and 
growth started already in the sixties with cross-sectional studies linking enrolment ratios 
and national product.
7
 In the late eighties, the attention of macroeconomists shifted toward 
the analysis of long-term economic growth, with a focus on the role of education and 
human capital that started with the crucial work of Lucas (1988). 
The question has been how human capital influences economic growth. Barro (2001) states 
that a higher initial stock of human capital means a higher ratio of human to physical 
capital, and this, in turn, generates economic growth through two channels. First, human 
capital enhances the adoption of better technologies from more developed countries. 
Second, as human capital is harder to adjust than physical capital, a country that starts with 
a high ratio of human to physical capital tends to grow fast because it adjusts upward the 
quantity of physical capital. Other researchers stress the importance of quality, rather than 
quantity, of schooling for economic growth. Hanushek and Kimko (2000) find that scores 
are more important, for growth, than years of schooling. The problem when dealing with 
quality of schooling is always data availability and reliability. However, Barro (ibid.) finds 
that scores are a significant predictors of economic performance, especially scores in 
scientific subjects, but that their effect is less than that of years of schooling in magnitude. 
Krueger and Lindahl (2001), in their review of both micro and macro literature, also 
conclude that, at a cross-country level, a change in education is positively associated with 
economic growth, once measurement error in education is accounted for. They also find 
that the return to education is higher in the cross-country model with respect to the within 
country one, thus suggesting that omitted variables or reverse causality generate a bias at 
the country level, or that there are nationwide externalities to education.  
Education, however, cannot be seen as the cure-all for economic development: when 
looking at the differences between developed and developing countries, the diffusion of 
education is only one of them. They differ with respect to a whole set of various matters: 
institutions, culture, infrastructures. It can as well be that countries that lack infrastructures 
and don’t perform well in general might not be able to pursue effective educational 
                                                 
7
 Svennilson, Edding and Elvin (1962), Harbison and Myers (1964), Bowman and Anderson (1963), 
McClelland (1966). 
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programs. If at a within country  level education may be taken as exogenous, this cannot be 
done at a national level: cross-country differences in education cannot be taken as a cause 
of income differences, as opposed to a result of current income (Krueger and Lindahl, 
2001). As a matter of fact, it seems that a lot of developing countries that have expanded 
access to schooling, educational opportunities and programs have not witnessed any 
particular catch-up with developed countries in terms of economic welfare (Hanushek and 
Woessmann, 2008) A notable exception to this statement being the performance of a few 
East-Asian countries, and more recently China, even though China’s dramatic increase in 
income has preceded the expansion in education, especially with respect to higher 
education. But it is important to stress that the successful Asian countries have put a whole 
set of policy at play thought all the Eighties and the Nineties, of which massive investment 
in education was only a part. 
Hanushek and Woessmann (2008) stress the key role of individual cognitive skills, stating 
that ignoring differences in cognitive skills significantly distorts the analysis of the 
relationship between education and economic outcomes. That, of course, raises the question 
of how cognitive skills are determined: are they entirely genetic in nature? Heckman (2007) 
in turn, stresses the role of early childhood education and environment in determining 
cognitive skills. 
Furthermore, the role of education in acquiring both basic and technical skills cannot be 
overlooked. McIntosh and Vignoles (2001) use UK data to assess the impact of basic skills 
on private earnings, and notwithstanding the caution against the possible bias due to the 
difficulty of measuring basic, they find enough evidence that basic numeracy is positively 
associated with higher earnings, as is basic literacy, even if the effect is of a lesser 
magnitude.  
In sum, overall the role of education in economic growth and welfare is far from being 
univocally assessed. 
Youth and children are a critical development issue. Children are especially vulnerable to 
economic and social exclusion, and at the same time they represent a central turning point 
for the future of developing countries: education has therefore become a priority in 
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development programs, such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) set by the 
United Nations.  
There are three main aspects of education that need to be taken into consideration: access to 
quality education (and hence, the provision of such education), school participation, and 
performances, (e.g. test scores). In most developing countries, the main focus of studies and 
policies is on the first two topics: school attendance, and school quality, which often 
translates in physical investment in schools. Of course, they cannot be entirely 
disentangled, as the latter is a clear pre-requisite of the former. 
All over the world, enrolment in school has been increasing dramatically over the past 
decades, and is now universal, at least for primary school. The following graph shows the 
trend for the gross enrolment ratio in the World, in low and middle income countries 
(according to the World Bank classification) and for the two countries addressed in the rest 
of this work: Egypt and Uganda. As we can see, the primary enrolment is well above the 
100%. Actually, we can see that in Uganda it has decreased over the last decade, thus 
indicating that children are going to school at the right age.
8
 
This indicator, however, is a very raw measure of education and schooling, also because 
being enrolled in school doesn’t assure continuity in school attendance, nor achievements. 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 The gross enrolment ratio is the ratio of all children enrolled in school, irrespective of their age, on the total 
number of children of the appropriate age. 
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Figure 1: Gross enrolment ratio (World Bank, Millennium Indicators 2013) 
A more specific measure of achieved education is the rate of primary completion. As the 
data are differentiated for females and males, the following graphs illustrate the trend in 
primary completion by gender. As we can see, the rates are well below the line of 100, and 
for Uganda they are below 60% (and have been decreasing in recent years, mostly for 
boys), while Egypt reaches almost 100%. These graphs well illustrate one of the main 
problems in developing countries, which is school completion. School completion is by far 
more important as a measure of human capital than enrolment, while the latter is a good 
measure for access to education. 
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Figure 2: Primary completion rate, males (World Bank, Millennium Indicators 2013) 
  
 
Figure 3: Primary completion rate, females (World Bank, Millennium Indicators 2013) 
 
Another important indicator of a the human capital of a country is youth literacy rate, that 
is, the rate of young people (15-24) able to read and write. There are too many missing 
values to have a trend as for the previous indicators, but the following table gives the 
literacy rate of youths. 
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Countries Literacy rate, youths 15-24 (%) 
Egypt 87,5 
Uganda 87,4 
Low & middle income countries 87,8 
World 89,4 
Table 1: Literacy rate (World Bank data, 2011) 
 
As we can see, Egypt and Uganda rates are in line with the one of low and middle income 
countries, while the rate is higher at a global level. These rates are, as expected, slightly 
lower for females than for males, but the difference is of small magnitude. 
Data on school quality are more difficult to find, at a disaggregate level. The following 
graph shows the total expenditure in education in percentage of GDP. As we can see, a rise 
in expenditures has been followed by a slight decrease. We can also see that in Uganda this 
rate remains very low. 
 
Figure 4: Total expenditure in education, % of GDP (World Bank data) 
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Glewwe et al. (2011) in their extensive review of empirical studies for developing 
countries, find that, so far, evidence from the “supply” side of the problem has been 
lacking, and is sometimes mixed. They find a generally positive effect of school 
infrastructure and learning material (such as textbooks and school furniture) among the 
studies they survey, and also evidence of positive effects of teachers and principals 
characteristics. Also, school organization, such as the ratio of pupils per teacher, has an 
impact on school attainments. The presence of several significantly negative results for the 
same variables, however, suggests caution when looking at these results. Therefore, one can 
conclude that emphasis should also be placed on the “demand” side, and children’s 
participation to school (i.e. school attendance) is probably strongly related to family 
decisions and backgrounds.  
Infrastructure and public investment aside, in the developing world education is faced with 
two major issues: the first is health, as poor health prevents children from attending school, 
and poor health of their guardians can mean that they lack supervision or have to care for 
them. The other main problem preventing effective education is child labour, both for the 
market and for the household needs. Child labour is a delicate subject, and a review of the 
literature on this topic is beyond the scope of the present work. Basu, in his fundamental 
paper (1999) argues that a complete ban on child labour may not be desirable, per se 
(except for the worst forms of child labour), because in very poor countries child labour is a 
survival strategy for many households, and that legislation on the matter should be 
conditional on the specific economic environment. In general, it is assumed that children’s 
work will interfere with their schooling, but the extent of this effect is difficult to assess, 
especially because there are several identification and endogeneity issues in empirical 
works. Assaad et al. (2010) find evidence of domestic work generally reducing schooling 
for girls in Egypt, and evidence that work becomes detrimental when above 10 hours per 
week for girls, and 14 for boys (Assaad et al. 2010). Another problem in developing 
countries are children who neither work nor go to school, i.e. “idle” children, but this 
problem is even more difficult to tackle in empirical studies. 
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Having assessed the importance of education and human capital, the next question is: how 
human capital formed? 
 
2. Human capital formation as a consequence of family choices 
 
Human capital is a complex theoretical concept that is difficult to define in a  uniform 
manner. In its most general definition, it refers to the people’s personal resources. 
According to OECD, Human Capital is “the knowledge, skills, competencies and attributes 
that allow people to contribute to their personal and social well-being, as well as that of 
their countries”.9 People cannot be separated from their skills, health or values in the way 
they can be separated from their financial and physical assets. Education and training are 
the key factors in forming human capital, as seen in the previous section. 
 
Gary Becker's (1975) household production theory in addition to the human capital theory 
directly links household resources and investments to the educational attainment of 
children. In Becker’s analysis families have a choice between investments in human capital 
of each child and the number of children they have. With the increasing value of the 
parents' time, families do not want to have as many children and shift toward doing more 
for each child -greater concern about health, schooling, and so on. In order to grow "quality 
children", according to Becker (1995), parents have to choose how to spend their time and 
economic resources. 
 
Another seminal study is that by Behrman et al. (1982) which develops a general 
preference model in order to analyze parental allocations of resources among their progeny 
and finds that parents care about their offspring’s earnings inequality, therefore providing 
the less able of their children with more resources than what is consistent with a pure 
investment model. Ermisch and Francesconi, in a more recent study (Ermisch and 
Francesconi, 2000), deepen this household production model, analyzing the impact of 
family background on young people's educational attainment. They find a strong 
                                                 
9
 Keeley (2007) “Human Capital, how what you know shapes your life”, OECD insight. 
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relationship between Parents' educational attainments and their children's educational 
attainments. In their previous analysis, they found also that mothers with a high level of 
education instil the importance of education in their children and that the mother’s values 
have a greater impact on children’s values with respect to the father’s education (Ermisch 
and Francesconi, 1997) 
 
Other studies also emphasize the correlations that exist between family structure, parents' 
working time, ethnic group of origin and educational attainment and the level of education 
reached by the child. In particular Boggess (1998) examines the effect of family structure 
on high school graduation by race and gender. He finds that a widowed, divorced, or 
separated mother has little or no effect on the educational attainment of the child once we 
control for economic status. Living in a step family, instead, appears to have a persistent 
negative effect on high school graduation rates. Another important study which examines 
the effects of background and familial factors on children’s educational attainments is that 
of De Serf (2002), who investigates the existence of educational gaps among children of 
different racial groups. 
 
Björklund and Salvanes (2010) in their extensive work, review the recent empirical 
literature related to education and family background, with a double motivation. On one 
hand, there is equality of opportunity, as family background is not chosen by individuals. 
Hence, assessing the importance of family background in determining education is crucial 
from an equality (and a policy) point of view. On the other hand, the second motivation for 
this type of research is often the effects of family background on child development. This 
second argument attains more specifically to the literature of cognitive skills which refers 
to Heckman and is mentioned further in the present review. They find that empirical 
evidence suggests that, in modern societies, differences in family backgrounds can account 
for even 60% of inequality. The vast majority of recent research, they find, attributes this to 
intergenerational relationships between parental education and offspring’s education. 
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2.1 Investment decisions 
 
Parents’ decision about whether  and how much to invest in their children’s human capital 
depends on many factors, and these decisions affect in the long run each child ‘s earnings 
prospects and general welfare. Usually research, as mentioned above, focuses on easy to 
observe characteristics such as gender, birth order and family composition, because the 
crucial variable, i.e. the child ability, is mostly unobservable. More recently, some works 
attempt to use direct measurements of a child ability such as IQ scores or cognitive tests. 
Ayalew (2005) examines parental investment decisions in relation to differences in innate 
endowments among siblings, analyzing health endowments, and finds that the return 
maximization is a dominant aim in educational investment decisions. Kim (2005), using IQ 
scores of high school juniors in Wisconsin, finds that higher ability children receive more 
parental transfer.  All these studies, however,  are undermined by  endogeneity issues and 
identification problems difficult to overcome. IQ scores can easily be a by-product of early 
education, and giving more transfer can be related to higher income or a different attitude 
towards children, which may be related to children’s ability. 
As Heckman (2007, and Conti and Heckman, 2012) and the whole literature on cognitive 
skills and neuroscience points out, early childhood environment and familial background 
are crucial for the development of a child’s ability. This literature emphasizes the role of 
early investment in children in shaping their cognitive and non-cognitive abilities, and, 
therefore, their educational outcomes and eventually their future outcomes in terms of 
wages, health and general welfare.  It may well be that unobserved parents’ characteristics, 
such as attitude or generosity (in the allocation of time and resources) towards children may 
have a positive influence on children’s natural ability. Therefore, this kind of results should 
be taken with a grain of salt. Leibowitz (1974) develops a causal model of home investment 
in children and tests it. She tests the model and finds evidence that home investments                                                                                                                                                                      
do increase the stock of childhood human capital, even if the children are very able. The 
study also finds that, while education at an adult age is related to parents’ education and to 
family size, there is no evidence of it being related to a more direct measure of home 
investment in early childhood.  
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Economists have a long-standing interest in the question of how parents allocate resources 
to children with different endowments, where endowments are broadly defined as 
genetically inherited characteristics that are predetermined prior to the human capital 
accumulation process and are rewarded directly or indirectly (through their interaction with 
human capital investments). The economic theory of intra-household resource allocation 
suggests that parental investment could compensate for or reinforce initial endowments. On 
the one hand, if parents are concerned only with maximizing the aggregate welfare of their 
children they might reinforce initial endowments by investing relatively more in their 
better-endowed children, assuming that marginal returns to investing are higher for better-
endowed children than they are for lesser-endowed children (Becker and Tomes 1976). On 
the other hand, equity concerns might drive parents to compensate for low initial 
endowments by investing relatively more in their lesser-endowed children under the same 
assumptions about the marginal returns to investment (Behrman, Pollak, and Taubman 
1982). Whether parents compensate for or reinforce initial endowments has implications for 
the intergenerational transmission of human capital, the long-term consequences of policies 
that seek to improve initial endowments, the distribution of human capital and income, and 
the econometric estimation of the impact of endowments on subsequent short- and long-
term educational, health, and labour market outcomes. 
 
A broad body of empirical literature has sought to determine whether parental investments 
compensate for or reinforce endowments (Behrman, Rosenzweig, and Taubman 1994; 
Griliches 1979; Pitt, Rosenzweig, and Hassan 1990; Rosenzweig and Schultz 1982; 
Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1988). The econometric approach of this literature has generally 
assumed that endowments are observable to parents but unobservable to researchers. 
Consequently, the literature has relied on indirect tests of whether parents compensate for 
or reinforce parental investment, the validity of which is contingent on functional form and 
other identifying assumptions. 
 
Datar, Kilbur and Loughran (2010) address this problem, estimating how the difference in 
birth weight across siblings impacts specific parental investments: breast-feeding, well-
baby visits, immunizations, and preschool attendance.  In this work they can directly 
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analyze how endowments are related to parental investments in early childhood, a period of 
a child life time when investments have been shown to be crucial for the development of 
their human capital. They find that parents tend to reinforce children’s endowments, 
privileging children with higher endowments.  
 
Wang et al. (2009) analyze the substitution effects in parental investment in rural China, in 
the presence of unobserved family heterogeneity, unequal parental valuations of their 
investments across children, and unobserved differences in child abilities. They use data of 
educational and marital investments, and they find that parents tend to compensate for 
unequal investment in education with marital investments, and they suggest that these 
differences are indeed strategic decisions made by parents. 
 
To investigates the allocation of resources within the household, some authors exploit the 
concept of siblings’ rivalry.  Siblings’ rivalry is the idea that within a household there is 
competition among siblings for limited resources. When market constraints are binding, a 
child with less siblings will be, all other things being equals, better off. Literature on sibling 
rivalry in developing countries has traditionally focused on gender differences between 
siblings. The reason for that is obviously that culture is mostly male-biased, so that 
investment in girls will often be lower than in boys. Sibling rivalry in developing countries 
is documented by several works. 
 
In this framework, Akresh at al. (2012) analyze human capital investment decisions in 
Burkina Faso, focusing on the role that a child’s cognitive ability plays in a resource-
constrained household decision. They use the concept of siblings rivalry to assess the 
impact of parents’ knowledge of a child’s natural ability on their decision to invest in their 
children’s human capital. They find that a child who perform better at ability test score, has 
a higher likelihood of being enrolled in school. At the same time having siblings who have 
higher ability scores reduces the possibility of being enrolled in school. They use a panel 
with household fixed effects model, so they argue they can overcome identification 
problems.  
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Edmonds (2007) analysis for Nepal and Dammert (2010) for Guatemala and Nicaragua, 
find that when girls have comparative advantages in home production and the family 
cannot hire external work for those tasks, both boys and girls benefit from having more 
sisters (this outcome is very similar to the one of Garg and Morduch, 1998). Ota and 
Moffat (2007), in their analysis of Andhar Pradesh find that a key factor in the decision of 
schooling seems to be the presence of older, working sisters, while the same (older girls) 
are the ones worst-off within the household. They also find that boys compete only within 
their gender, while girls face a double competition. In general, they argue, parents tend to 
assign each child to a specific “task” (i.e. going to school, vs. home production, vs. market 
work). 
 
2.2 Bargaining models and children’s welfare 
 
Most of these models assume that family acts like a unique decision maker, where children 
are not part of the decision-making process, and are subject to their parents’ decisions. To 
overcome these limits of the “unitary model” household economics theory has evolved in 
models that consider intra-household bargaining between partners. 
10
 
 
Thomas (1990) analyzes the assumption that household income is pooled and then allocated 
to maximize welfare. The implication then should be that income in the hands of mothers 
and fathers should have the same impact. Using survey data from Brazil, he reject this 
hypothesis, and finds that income in the hands of the mothers has significantly larger 
effects on family’s general health and children’s survival probabilities. This result has been 
confirmed in further findings in empirical literature.
11
 
 Echevarria and Merlo (1999) investigates the issue of gender differences in education in a 
bargaining model where men and women bargain over consumption, number of children, 
and investment in education of their children, thus treating fertility and education choices as 
endogenous. The implication of the model is that gender differences in education of the 
offspring are smaller than in a pure investment model. 
                                                 
10
 For a review on the topic see Lundberg and Pollak, 1996. 
11
 See Taylor and Martin (2001), mentioned later. 
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In their work, Bernal and Fruttero (2007) analyze the effects of public policies on parental 
leaves and benefits, using a general equilibrium model of marriage and divorce and 
simulations on US data. Their general results is that parental policies (both paid and unpaid 
leaves) have a positive effect on children’s human capital. Rasul (2006) studies the 
implication of child custody arrangements, and finds that the custodial allocation decided 
upon by the spouses influences investment incentives, and in turn children’s quality. 
The findings of Foster (2002), in his study of marriage market in rural Bangladesh, support 
the hypothesis that marriage market structure has effects on parental desired schooling for 
their children. The study, however, focusing on selection before marriage, seems to be 
more in line with the unitary model of the household. 
Cigno (2012) develops a microeconomic model in which marriage provides a commitment 
device that can improve efficiency in the household decision making, with respect to 
cohabitation: because the efficiency conditions require division of labour between childcare 
and market work, efficiency cannot be obtained in a non-cooperative setting, and marriage 
can enhance cooperation. Thus, he argues, children of married couples should be of a better 
quality (and therefore have more human capital, if we assume Becker’s identification 
between quality and human capital) than children of non married ones. 
 
2.3 Other issues 
 
Another important issue regarding household in developing countries is customary 
traditions, such as polygyny, arranged marriages and dowry. Tertilt (2006) develops a 
model in which, allowing daughters to choose the husbands, even in a setting where 
polygyny exists, has a positive impact on a number of development issues, such as number 
of children per woman. Thus should result in better quality outcomes for children. 
In his game-theoretical model, Cigno (2007) finds that in developing countries it may be 
rational for parents to invest less in their daughters’ education, given that the skill premium 
and in general the returns in education are significantly lower than in developed countries, 
while is more efficient for them to invest in their daughters’ dowries. 
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In general, both the empirical and the theoretical literature stresses the importance of family 
background and decisions for children’s outcomes, especially concerning education 
decisions. The understanding of the mechanism through which this occurs is of crucial 
importance to better target policies aimed at increasing human capital and children’s 
welfare. As mentioned above, much of the most recent literature stresses the importance of 
early childhood investment, which is strongly related to family dynamics and allocations of 
time and resources. 
3. Theoretical models of schooling and human capital formation 
 
 
The present paragraph reviews the most representative theories and models of schooling 
and human capital formation developed over the past decades. As illustrated in the previous 
sections, from Becker and Mincer on the analysis of the demand for education has always 
been derived from the analysis of private economic returns to educations, namely 
individual earnings. In particular, Mincer (1970, 1974) developed a function for estimating 
individual returns to education which remains, to these days, the pillar of all the literature in 
the field. This section presents first the conceptual framework used by Hanushek and 
Woessmann, then the model for developing countries developed by Glewwe for empirical 
purpose, and third the work of Heckman on capabilities. This works summarize the main 
theoretical approaches and findings in the literature of human capital formation so far.  
 
3.1 Hanushek and Woessmann model 
 
Hanushek and Woessmann (2008) effectively summarize and unify the theoretical 
framework for human capital formation. They start from individual earnings (y), that are a 
function of a person’s human capital (H), which they treat as a one-dimensional index. 
Thus, the first relevant equation is that of individual earnings: 
 
       
 
The stochastic term, , represents idiosyncratic earnings differences and is orthogonal to H. 
(1) 
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This model is very abstract and simple, and aims at capturing the essence of earnings’ 
differences. It has been refined in many ways over time, mostly to take into consideration 
the underlying behaviour of individuals in terms of their investments in skills.
12
 This model 
is the central core of most empirical research on wage differentials and individual 
productivity.  
Individual skills (H) are determined by a range of factors, as family inputs (F), individual 
ability (A) and all other relevant factors (X), such as labour market experience, individual 
health, and the like. Quantity and quality of inputs provided by school are reunited in the 
function Q(S), where S is school quantity and Q the quality function that transforms S.
13
 
Then the function of H is: 
 
                      
 
Mostly, all empirical studies use the concept of human capital (H) as a latent variable, using 
school attainments (Q(S)) in its place, and then dealing in some way with the complications 
arising from not completely measuring H or its determinants in equation (2). Hanushek and 
Woessmann (ibid.) propose an alternative approach, based on direct measurement of 
cognitive skills. 
Test score measures of cognitive skills are standardized assessments of numeracy and 
literacy. If these measures, C, could capture completely the variations in H, then equation  
(1) could be estimated directly with C, and the estimation of parameter  would be 
unbiased. But, of course, test scores are not complete measures of H. Instead the 
achievement test measures, C, can be thought of as error prone measures of H, as shown in 
the following equation: 
 
      
 
                                                 
12
 See, for example: Ben-Porath (1967), Heckman (1976), Cunha et al. (2010). 
13
 The model is similar to that by Glewwe, reviewed afterwards in this section. 
(2) 
(3) 
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Then, with classical measurement errors, if we substitute C for H in equation (1) we would 
have an estimate of  biased toward zero14. Then, if we estimate both S and C  to capture 
the effects of both quantity of schooling and cognitive skills, the coefficient on S in the 
same estimated equation would be biased upward, even if S has no independent effect on 
earnings over and above its relationship with C
15
. This model would imply that the 
coefficient  on C would be a lower bound on the impact of human capital on incomes. As 
we see, we are always dealing with biased estimations, no matter the way used to define 
human capital. 
The most common development in empirical research, however, is the use of school 
attainment as a measure of human capital for estimating individual returns to schooling. 
The crucial point has generally been how to obtain an unbiased estimate of  (or a 
transformation of ) under various considerations of other factors that might influence 
earnings and skills. The more influential model has been that of Mincer (1970, 1974), 
mentioned above, who developed the famous “mincerian earnings equation”: 
 
                 
         
  
Where Z is labour market experience and W a vector of other factors affecting incomes (y). 
Significant attention has been given to the ability bias arising from the correlation of school 
attainment with individual ability (A) and from other selection effects (Card, 1999). Various 
estimates of the earnings model have added test scores to the Mincerian equation, in order 
to explicitly control for ability. 
Nonetheless, there are at least two complications with these models, The first is that 
schooling is only a partial factor influencing cognitive skills and human capital formation. 
The second is that the majority of applications of the Mincerian model assume that school 
quality is either constant or can be directly captured adding measures of school quality in 
the estimation equation. 
The importance of non-school influences on cognitive skills has been well documented. If 
the vector W in the earnings model includes the other  relevant influences on human capital 
                                                 
14
 Because the error term in 3 would capture some of the effects of  
15
 Because if they’re positively correlated C would “pull up” the estimation of S. 
(4) 
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from equation (2), the estimate of b1 would be only , if the school quality is constant. As 
it is difficult to have additional information on the determinants of skills outside the school, 
the estimation of b1 will always be biased. 
The second issue concerns variations in school quality: if school quality is not constant, one 
can assume Q(S) to be production function, as simple as: 
 
        
 
where time in school, S, is modified by a quality index, q. If the variations in q are small, 
this is not an issue for estimation. But this is clearly not the case in, f.e., an international 
context. 
Another important issue arises because human capital includes important elements of non-
cognitive skills. Those skills, if not precisely defined, include a variety of interpersonal 
dimensions, including communications ability, team work skills, and, in general, what are 
commonly called “social skills”. Several authors, like Bowles and Gintis (1976, and 
Bowles, Gintis and Osborne, 2001) and more recently Heckman (Heckman et al., 2006) 
have argued that non-cognitive skills are very important for the understanding of earnings 
differentials.  
Including non-cognitive skills N, human capital is now determined by: 
 
        
 
In this way, we can then re-write the general form of equation (2) to describe the 
underlying determinants of C and N. This also suggests a modification to the mincerian 
equation that includes C. Nonetheless, the impact of the schooling coefficient, b1, would 
still be biased by the influence of N which is unobservable. 
In conclusion, the review of the conceptual framework performed by Hanushek and 
Woessmann, emphasizes the role of direct measures of cognitive skills to better understand 
the link between human capital and economic returns, but doesn’t provide a solution to the 
intrinsic bias of such estimates, due to the nature of human capital as a conceptual 
(5) 
(6) 
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construct, and therefore subject to all the problems of such theoretical constructions and 
latent variables. 
 
3.2 Glewwe’s Model 
 
As mentioned before, the model by  Hanushek and Woessmann  is derived from the model 
developed by Glewwe (2002). Glewwe’s model is particularly useful for studying 
schooling choices in developing countries, because it explicitly take into account the 
quality of school, which is more likely to vary in a developing country. Also, school quality 
is likely to be a major issue in developing countries as well, as mentioned in the first 
section. For these reasons, Glewwe’s model is the reference model for the majority of 
empirical studies concerning developing countries. 
The model, as most household models, assumes that a child’s parents maximize an utility 
function, subject to constraints. The arguments of the utility function are consumption of 
goods and services (including leisure) at different points in time during the life-cycle,  and 
each child’s year of schooling and learning. So, parents draw utility from their children’s 
education. This hypothesis can be derived either from the assumption of parental altruism, 
or from the assumption that education is an investment for the parents: in his model, 
Glewwe assumes that when the child works, part of the earnings is given to the parents, so, 
if education increases earnings, parents will give more education the child. 
The utility function, on which parents base their choice whether to send their children to 
school or not, is therefore the following:   
 
            
 
where C1 and C2 are respectively present and future consumption, while A is the child 
cognitive skills.  is a discount factor for future consumption and  indicates parental tastes 
for educated children. 
 Children’s education can increase parent’s utility in two ways: indirectly through parents’ 
consumption, which is a function of years of schooling and children’s income, directly 
(6) 
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through  A. In fact, present and future consumption are represented through the following 
equations: 
 
                 
 
         
 
In those equations Y1, Y2  and Yc are respectively  parental income in period 1, in period 2 
and child’s income when he is working. While p represents the price of schooling and k the 
fraction of child income given to the parents.  Finally, S is the time spent in schooling, 
while 1-S is the time spent working.  A simple product shows how cognitive skills are 
acquired by the child:   
 
 
            
 
The term  represent the “learning efficiency” of the child, and includes innate (genetically 
inherited) ability, child motivation, and parental motivation and capacity to help children 
with their schoolwork. Q is school quality and S is years of schooling. Child cognitive skills 
are directly linked with child income as follows: 
 
      
 
where  is productivity of cognitive skills in the labour market. Starting from the first 
equation, and performing various substitutions, we get the parental utility function: 
 
                                   
 
The model continues considering two cases, one where school quality is exogenous and 
therefore S is the only choice variable, and the other one where the parents also choose 
school quality.  
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
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In the first case the optimal years of schooling, S*, are an increasing function of: child 
learning efficiency (), school quality (Q) and the relative weight parents give to future 
parental tastes for schooling (). S* are instead a decreasing function of the price of 
schooling (p). Finally,  the effect of k and p on S* is ambiguous. 
In the second case, the parents also choose the quality of the school. The assumption that 
higher quality implies higher price of schooling is represented as follows: 
 
      
 
Where p0 is the base price of schooling.  
Assuming that          and         , then the optimal values of S and Q are: 
 
                           
 
                 
                         
 
Optimal years of schooling, S*, are positively affected by  ( the relative weight parents 
give to future consumption) and  (parental tastes for schooling) while school quality 
increases with the previous two parameters and with  (learning efficiency). School quality 
is also negatively affected by p (price of schooling).  
Beyond these considerations, there are less direct and intuitive results that emerge from a 
more careful analysis. Firstly, if the quality of the school is exogenous and we control for 
parental tastes for schooling, it is not certain that parents who give greater weight to future 
consumption will send their children to school for more years. Secondly, an increase in 
returns of cognitive skills does not necessarily correspond to an increase in the number of 
years of schooling, because it rises the opportunity cost of an additional year of school. 
Finally, when school quality is also a choice variable, the years of schooling and school 
quality are alternative inputs in the production of cognitive skills. The best parental 
response to an increase in the base price of schooling may be to adjust school quality, 
holding years of schooling constant. 
 
(13) 
(14) 
(12) 
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The application of this model to the econometric analysis allows us to discuss about several 
issues concerning the estimation of the impact of school characteristics on cognitive skills. 
The function for the child skill s is the following: 
 
                   
 
Decomposing the multi-dimensional variables Q and  it becomes: 
 
                                  
 
The terms µ,ρ, and  represent, respectively, the unknown parameters to be estimated and 
the measurement error in A (it could reflect also omitted variables, or measurement error 
pertaining to , Q, and S). The index n represents distinct school characteristics that affect 
learning, while the index m represents the factors that affect learning efficiency. Some 
school characteristics are difficult to observe and several datasets that collect information 
about schooling in developing countries have only a small number of school quality 
variables.  
 
Some examples of features linked to Q are, as mentioned in the first section, teachers’ 
characteristics and school leaders’ management skills. Regarding the components of 
learning efficiency some of these are easy to observe like, for example, parents’ education, 
while others, as child innate ability and motivation and parents’ willingness and capacity to 
help their children with schoolwork, are more difficult to observe and measure. Due to 
these difficulties in observing these factors, it is possible that the obtained estimates are 
biased. There is in fact the possibility that the residual term  is correlated with the other 
independent variables. When school quality is exogenous, S is positively correlated with  
and that will lead to biased estimates of the school-quality parameters. Moreover, school 
quality is likely to be endogenous. According to Glewwe, even in rural areas of developing 
countries parents may be able to influence school quality. They can directly alter the quality 
of local schools through parent-teacher associations (PTA) or indirectly sending their 
children to non-local schools or migrating to areas with better schools. In all these cases, 
(15) 
(16) 
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when parents can alter school quality overestimation or underestimation are possible. 
Instrumental variables are a way to solve this problem and to obtain consistent parameter 
estimates (one possible instrument for years of schooling is the price of schooling, which 
should affect learning only by affecting years of schooling). 
 
3.3 Heckman’s model of investment in human capabilities 
 
One of the most recent development in this literature is the one by Heckman (2007) who, 
drawing from the literature of neuroscience, argues that early childhood well-being is 
fundamental for the formation of human capital. He develops a model of investment in 
human capabilities. 
Starting from the assumption that individuals possess a vector of capabilities, at each age, 
that includes: pure cognitive abilities, non-cognitive abilities, and health stocks. All 
capabilities are produced by investment, environment, and genes. All capabilities are used 
in the labour market differently, thus possibly contributing to earnings. 
The capability formation process is governed by a multistage technology. Each stage 
corresponds to a period in the lifecycle of a child, and inputs or investments at each stage 
produce outputs at the next stage. Qualitatively different inputs can be used at different 
stages and the technologies can be different, at different stages of the child development. 
The outputs at each stage are the changes in capability at that stage.  
The capabilities produced at one stage enhance the capabilities attained at later stages, in a 
process of “self-productivity”. The idea is that capabilities are self-reinforcing and have 
positive effects on one another. A second key feature of capability formation according to 
Heckman, is “dynamic complementarity”, which means that a type of capability produced 
at one stage raises the productivity of investment in another type of capability at a later 
stage. 
Heckman’s model starts assuming that altruistic parents invest in their children.16  
It represents parental investments in child capabilities when the child is t years old, and t=1, 
2, … T 
                                                 
16
 Not assuming altruism means the model has to find an endogenous reason for parents to invest in children. 
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The output of the investment is a skill vector, and the parent is assumed to have full control 
over the investment process. Heckman’s model also assumes that h, parental capabilities, is 
constant over time. It may be that if it changes over time, investments in children change 
accordingly 
At conception, the child receives a pool of initial genetic and environmental conditions, 1. 
Then we have parental capabilities, h, which are in turn the products of their own parents’ 
investments and genes. Then, at each stage t, there is a vector of capabilities, t, and the 
technology of capability production is
17
: 
 
                  
 
Substituting for t , t-1 ,…,repeatedly, the stock of capabilities at stage t+1 is then a 
function of all past investments: 
 
                                  
 
This function gives dynamic complementarity if: 
 
             
       
   
 
i.e. when the stocks of capabilities acquired up to period t (t) make It more productive. 
This explains, according to Heckman, why returns to educational investments are higher at 
later stages of a child’s life for more able, more healthy and more motivated children (those 
with higher t). We have self- productivity if 
 
            
   
   
                                                 
17
 Ft is assumed to be strictly increasing and concave in It, and twice differentiable in all its arguments.   
(17) 
(18) 
(20) 
(19) 
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i.e. when higher levels of capabilities in one period create higher levels of capabilities in 
the next
18
. 
The joint effect of these two properties can explain the higher productivity of public 
intervention to sustain disadvantaged young children, with respect to intervention to sustain 
adolescents who come from disadvantaged backgrounds
19
. 
 
In general, this model of capabilities production technology gives a theoretical background 
for policy aimed at investing more in early childhood. It stresses the importance of 
environmental conditions in early childhood and the importance of intervention at early 
stages of life. It can also be seen as an additional theoretical motive for investing in the 
general improvement of the population and its living conditions. For example, even if 
investing in adult education may not have a point for their personal returns in a developing 
country, it can highly improve the outcomes of their children. For the same reasons, 
investing in female education can be seen as an investment in children’s capabilities. In this 
event parental capabilities, h, would vary over time, requiring an extension of this model. 
  
                                                 
18
 Ft is the function that produces capabilities for the next period, t+1. 
19
 Heckman’s analysis then proceeds to explain more in details the analytical properties of the production 
function, but this is beyond the scope of this paragraph. 
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4. Family mobility and its effect on human capital formation 
 
Mobility can take different forms and have different causes, and thus entail different effects 
on children’s lives. Mobility may mean migration, of one or both parents or the whole 
family, it can mean moving from one village to another, from one region to another in the 
same country, or it can mean to leave the country they were born in. In any case, it is a 
major event in one person’s life, and even a greater one in children’s lives, as children are 
more vulnerable, emotionally and practically. Mobility occurs for various reasons: search 
for work, marriage, education, natural events or man-made calamity such as war or civil 
strife. In the latter case, it can be a traumatic event that affects children’s lives and 
outcomes in a very deep way. 
The common factor in all the types of mobility is that children rarely have a say in this kind 
of decision: they have no other choice than to comply with it, and follow their families. 
 
4.1 The decision to move 
 
Standard economic theory assumes that the decision to move is taken at the individual 
level. In the household context, however, moving is not and individual decision, as its 
benefits and costs are likely to involve other members of the household. If we consider a 
non-unitary model of the household (see section 2) then the decision to move will be the 
result of a bargaining process of the two decision-makers in the household (namely, the 
couple). The first theoretical model in this respect is the one by Mincer (1978). 
He starts by explicitly recognizing that it is the “net family gain” rather than the personal 
one, to motivate the family decision to move.
20
 In a one-person household, move takes 
place when  
 
            
 
                                                 
20
 Of course, the distinction disappears in the family consist in a one-person household. 
(21) 
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where Gi is the individual gain from moving, Ri are returns and Ci are costs. In a household 
with n individuals, move takes place if             where       
 
  and the same 
for Rf and Cf. 
As obvious, families tend to move less than single individuals. The economic reason is that, 
as household size increase, families’ returns from mobility increase less than the total costs. 
Although it is possible that there are some economies of scale in moving, it is well possible 
that the diseconornies can outweigh them. Empirical research (Long 1975) confirms the 
negative effect of the presence of children on family mobility. One source of “immobility” 
in the presence of children is their schooling. Residential choices of the family are often 
influenced by the possibility to access schools which the parents prefer, both in term of 
price and quality.. Once children are attending such schools, the costs of residential 
mobility increase. Long's research, indeed, shows that the presence of school-age children 
is the key factor inhibiting families from moving, rather than family size. For the same 
reason, the prospective schooling of children may as well be a causal factor for accelerating 
mobility when the children are still of preschool age. 
Mincer doesn’t address this problem theoretically: instead, he focuses on two actors, in the 
family, who are indeed the actors making all the decisions. So, net family gain from 
moving is             
where 1 and 2 are the subscripts for husband and wife. In order for the family to move, Gf 
must be positive. If G1 and G2 have the same sings, than there is no problem, because each 
one of the spouses will have the same preferences. If the signs of G1 and G2 differ, then the 
key point becomes the absolute value of the net loss of the “tied mover” or the “tied 
stayer”21. In both cases, the tied partner is one whose absolute value of loss (gain) is less 
than the absolute value of gain (loss) of the other partner. Mincer then illustrates a possible 
distribution of tied movers and stayers, and analyzes the factors that reduce or enhance the 
probability of moving for a family. The general findings of Mincer’s model are that having 
a family (as is somewhat obvious) reduces the probability of moving. This effect is 
especially bigger in a two-earner family, where the Gi are likely to have different signs, 
family dissolution is therefore more probable if both spouses work. Also, he finds that the 
                                                 
21
 “tied mover/stayer” are the terms originally used by Mincer in his work (1978) 
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initial (and expected) comparative advantages of family members in market and household 
activities tend to be reinforced by family mobility decisions. 
Expanding his analysis, Mincer looks at migration ties and he states that gains from 
migration need not be of opposite signs to create family ties. If there are multiple 
destinations, ties exist so long as there are discrepancies between actual and maximum 
potential gains from migration, as measured by a general formulation: 
 
     
             
        
 
Where   
    is the maximal gain from moving. If there is only one possible destination, 
because the move will favour only, for example, spouse 1, then   
       and    
      
and      . In this case, T can be seen as a negative externality of moving, for the 
family. 
 
Empirical studies find that family ties are actually a major deterrent for family mobility, as 
childless couples and those with only pre-school aged children are the most likely to move 
(Nivalainen, 2004), and it is true that the most important pull factor is, in general, the 
husband career, while the wife become a “tied” mover, often becoming unemployed or 
underemployed, or exiting the labour force
22
. 
 
However, Mincer model doesn’t consider explicitly children’s utility (children’s welfare) in 
the family decision of moving. It is assumed to be comprised in family welfare, Gf. But 
since children don’t usually have a say in the decision making process, we must assume 
that children’s welfare is included in parents’ utility function.  
Here I try to set up the some simple assumptions that could serve as benchmark to develop 
the model. 
The usual utility function
23
 including children’s utility, on a one-period time and for each 
parent, should be of the type: 
                                                 
22
 These results are in line with earlier literature, see for example the results from Sandell (1977) and Spitze 
(1984). Different results are found in Cooke and Bailey (1996), who finds a positive effect of family 
migration on women’s employment, in the United States 
23
 See, for example, Cigno (2012) 
(22) 
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Where ai is consumption of parent i, n is the number of children, and Uc is each child utility 
function. Assuming that parents are altruistic and that children’s utility is: 
 
           
 
Where c is child consumption (of goods and other resources, as f.e. parents’ time) and Gc 
are the net gains from moving. The parents then should maximize their own private utility, 
including their children’s ones. 
This formulation also assumes that children are local public goods, i.e. both parents derive 
the same utility from their children’s welfare, this is the equivalent of implicitly assuming 
assortative mating. Parents, however, could as well have different preferences for their 
children’s welfare, of evaluate it differently, which would cause more complication in the 
decision process and the maximization of family welfare. Furthermore, parents could 
evaluate children’s gains from moving incorrectly, because they don’t have direct 
information.
24
 The decision of moving may entail negative externalities for children, which 
cannot be anticipated by parents. The same results may also apply to the decision of 
staying, but this cannot be explored by empirical analysis, as it is difficult to have 
information on people previous intentions. Also, the effects of such decision may be 
observed only further in time. 
Another important point is that Mincer’s model assumes that the decision to move is 
relevant to the family because the whole family needs to move. Even the decision of a 
single member, however, can affect the whole family, especially when the member leaving 
the household is an adult, and namely one of the parents. Thus, the same mechanisms could 
apply. 
  
                                                 
24
 Because they may lack information on their chidren’s preferences, and/or because they are experience 
goods. 
(23) 
(24) 
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4.2 Empirical evidence of the effects of family mobility 
 
The empirical literature has studied the effects of family mobility on children’s and 
adolescents’ welfare mostly in the fields of psychology and health, and mostly for 
developed countries. The same can be said for the literature addressing the problems of 
children living with only one parent, as it is a field related to research on divorce, which is 
far more common in developed countries.  
There is research evidence that frequent residential mobility during childhood can have 
adverse consequences for adolescent functioning and development, but evidence is still 
somewhat mixed. In the last decade, studies have shown that family mobility has 
significant effects on various adolescent behaviours, such as lower educational attainments 
(Pribesh and Downey, 1999), higher rate of school dropout (Teachman, Paasch & Carver, 
1996) and risky behavior like drug and alcohol use (Hoffman and Johnson, 1998) or 
premature and promiscuous sex (South, Haynie and Bose, 2005), that often results in a 
higher risk of teen pregnancy (Sucoff and Upchurch, 1998). 
Scanlon and Devine (2001) review the relevant literature, mainly in the field of sociology, 
which finds mostly negative correlation between moving and children’s welfare. At the 
same time, they argue that household moves are not inherently problematic, and that the 
outcomes depends on many factors. Moreover, they stress the fact that moving away from 
poverty and degraded environment is, indeed, desirable.  
However, there is an extensive body of literature finding a significant relationship between 
residential mobility and decreased academic performance.
25
 Both in terms of test scores
26
 
and students’ grade point average27. There are studies contradicting these findings, or 
suggesting that the effects are weaker (f.e. Alexander et al., 1996). They argue that mobility 
studies fail to take into account pre-existing differences between movers and non-movers 
and to control for significant moderating variables. Goebel (1978) finds that high rates of 
mobility in pre-school years don’t affect negatively academic performance in later years. 
Moves, however, seem to be correlated with grades retention (which is correlated with 
school’s dropout), as found in Simpson and Fowler (1994) and Wood et al. (1993). 
                                                 
25
 Temple and Reynolds (1999), Tucker, Marx and Long (1998). 
26
 Audette, Algozzine and Warden (1993), Shuler (1990). 
27
 Simmons et al. (1987). 
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Other factors must be taken into account when measuring the effects of mobility on 
children’s educational outcomes. Tucker, Marx and Long (1998) find a significant 
interaction between mobility and family structure. They find that moderate levels of 
mobility have no measurable effects on school performance if children live with both of 
their biological parents. They suggest that what is more distressful for a child is the 
disruption of family structure, rather than moving per se. 
Mobility can act also as an amplifier of the family economic and social distress, as usually 
moving and relocating occurs mostly among the poorest and disadvantaged portion of 
society (Nichols and Gault, 1999).  In this case, the effects on children’s welfare could be 
even bigger. 
One recent empirical study contradicting the majority of results relative to educational 
outcomes is that of Hango (2006), who analyzes the 1986 Canadian  General Social Survey, 
for individuals aged 25 and above. He suggests that, in the long run, residential mobility in 
childhood is beneficial for later educational attainment, because he finds that those who 
moved between birth and the age of 15 are more likely to graduate from high school than 
those who remained in the same community.  
Jelleyman and Spencer (2008) conduct a systematic review of the studies relating mobility 
during childhood and health effects. They find that high rates of mobility are associated 
with increased behavioural problems during childhood and adolescence, but there is only 
limited evidence supporting a causal relationship between the two. They also find evidence 
that interactions at a neighbourhood level can be relevant, exacerbating or buffering the 
impact of moving. 
Insum, evidence is mixed, with a slightly higher propensity toward a negative influence of 
moving to be taken cautiously, possibly very much dependent on the specific context 
analyzed. 
  
So far, the focus of this review has been on the general concept of mobility. In fact the term 
“mobility” has a more general meaning, and therefore it has been preferred here to 
“migration”. One can think of migration as a special case of mobility, as migration can 
differ from general mobility in at least three respects. First, in the last decades, with the 
increased mobility of populations all over the world, the meaning of “migration” has almost 
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entirely overlapped with the term “international migration”, and in particular with 
migration occurring from poor to rich countries, usually south-north migration. Second, 
migration is more often associated with the individual move of only one member of the 
family, rather than with the move of the entire family. Third, mobility can refer to a 
temporary move, while migration is usually associated with a more permanent decision 
(though there are examples of temporary migration, as is often the migration of oil workers 
from North Africa to the Gulf countries). 
 The next sections will illustrate the main findings concerning the effects of migration on 
children’s outcomes. 
 
4.3 Migration and human capital: remittances 
 
The literature on migration has been increasing considerably over the last decades. The 
main focus in economics, beside the effects on the labour market of the receiving countries, 
has been on the effects of remittances from migrants to their families of origin. In 
particular, emphasis has been placed on the effects of remittances on children’s schooling. 
A number of papers aim at establishing the causal impact of remittances on human 
development outcomes, through the relaxation of the household budget constraint. There is 
a general agreement that remittances flows have a significant positive impact on child 
school attendance and literacy. 
Yang (2008) examines the effects of international remittances in the Philippines, using the 
East Asian Crisis as an exogenous shock to migrants’ incomes, and finds that remittances 
have a positive effects on school attendance and, at the same time, a negative effect on 
child labour. These findings seem to be rather robust because this study, exploiting the 
geographic dispersion of migrants from the Philippines, uses an exogenous variation in 
their incomes. This way, it is possible to analyze how origin households are responding to 
remittance receipts and transitory income shocks. Lopez-Cordova (2005) finds the same 
results on school attendance and literacy in Mexico. Edwards and Ureta (2003) find that, in 
El Salvador, children from families that receive remittances are less likely to drop out of 
school. Adams (2005) analyzes data from Guatemala, and finds that remittances receiving 
households spend more on education than on consumption. One contrary study is the one of 
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Adams et al. (2008) which finds that in Ghana households do not spend more, at the 
margin, on educational investments.  
Focusing on the distinction between internal and international migration, Giannelli and 
Binci (2013), using panel data from Vietnam, find evidence supporting a stronger impact of 
domestic versus international remittances on increasing schooling and reducing child 
labour. 
There are several critiques that can be made to this strand ofliterature. First, there is the 
problem of migrants self selection, which makes it difficult to establish a causal link 
between remittances and children’s education. Migration is in its nature a self selective 
process: not everyone desires to migrate, and not everyone can translate the desire to 
migrate into actual migration. Therefore, all studies on migration suffer from some kind of 
selection bias. If the unobservable characteristics that have influence on the migration 
decision also affect the decision to invest in children’s schooling (and that may as well be 
the case), than estimates are biased. Bryant (2005) suggests that children in migrant 
households have a higher probability to attend better quality private schools. Therefore, 
researcher should find a way to deal with this issue. The increasing availability of panel 
data in recent years makes it easier to deal with it. The second point is that most of this 
literature deals only with school quantity but, as mentioned above, school quality, and the 
quality of the whole process of learning is crucial, as pointed out by Coronel and 
Unterreiner (2005). The third point to stress is that results may vary due to external context 
factors: as mentioned above, if a country lacks basic infrastructures, or, if the household 
receiving remittances are very close, or under, the line of poverty, remittances are probably 
more likely used for basic consumption and needs. 
Overall, the findings show that remittances are associated with an increase in child 
schooling.  
In particular, the above mentioned work of Lopez-Cordova (2005) finds evidence 
supporting the view that international remittances tend to lead to improved development 
outcomes, at an aggregate level. This study uses a cross-section from Mexico 
municipalities, and shows that a rise in the fraction of international remittances-receiving 
households in an area is associated with better educational outcomes. These findings are 
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strong, because instruments
28
 were used to address the endogeneity problems, so that the 
study can establish a causal link. 
A part of the literature also focuses on the role of women in the use of remittances. Taylor 
and Martin (2001) show that remittances are associated with a change in social hierarchy, 
with the women whose husband migrated becoming a new class of money lenders, and so 
improving their social status. They also find evidence that women spend relatively more on 
their children’s welfare. Furthermore, there is the influence of remittances (or, more 
precisely, the influence of migration) on social and cultural norms (Levitt, 1998).  
 
Another effect of remittances found by the empirical literature is the increase in girls’ 
education. Mansuri (2006) finds large positive effects of temporary economic migration on 
educational attainment, especially for girls. Hanson and Woodruff (2003), using data from 
Mexico
29
 and using instrument for household migration decisions with an interaction term 
between historical state migration and household characteristics, find that migration to the 
US is associated with an increase in girls’ schooling. 
The study of McKenzie and Rapoport (2006) also uses Mexico as a case study, and also 
uses historical data as instruments for endogenous variables. Using an ordered model
30
 to 
take into account different effects on different levels of education, they find a negative 
effect on school attainments of boys and girls in their teenage years (16-18 years for girls 
and 12-18 for boys). They also find that the effects of migration are nonlinear and differ for 
different levels of schooling. 
 
4.4 Migration and human capital: brain drain and brain gain 
 
Another important issue in the relationship between human capital accumulation and 
migration is the effects that the prospect of migration can have on the decision of 
accumulating human capital made by people who do not migrate themselves. This effect 
can go in opposite ways. The effect of the so-called “brain gain” states that potential 
                                                 
28
 Historical migrations rates and distance from the US border were use as instruments.  
29
 Mexico is often studied due to U.S. interest in Mexican migration and data availability. 
30
 IV- Censored Ordered Probit. 
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migration can be a motivational effect that induces an increase in educational attainments. 
Stark et al. (1997) develop a model under which a the positive probability of employment 
in a different country raises the level of human capital in the home country. While some 
workers migrate, “taking along” the accumulated human capital (a form of brain drain), 
other workers stay in the home country with more human capital than they would have 
formed in the absence of the possibility of migration, thus raising the country general level 
of human capital. The effect can go the opposite way if the prospect of migration is one of 
earning higher incomes without additional education (the so called “brain drain”). Fan and 
Stark (2007)  analyzes both the negative and the positive impact of migration by skilled 
individuals. Their work shows that, in the short run, international migration can result in 
‘educated unemployment’ and over-education in developing countries, as well as a brain 
drain from these countries. However, using a dynamic framework, it then shows that the 
positive externality effect of the formation of human capital economic-wide prevails. For 
this reason, they suggest that a relaxation in migration policy in both the current period and 
the preceding period can facilitate ‘take-off’ of a developing country. Nonetheless, it seems 
that the incentive channel is predominant over the “drain” problem (Clemens, 2009). On 
the other hand, a point of major concern for developing countries is the drain of highly 
skilled and qualified workers, for example medical staff or teachers, because of their 
investment in technical formation and education, and the impossibility to collect the returns 
of such investments. 
The work by De Haas et al (2008) is a critical review of the relationship between migration 
and human development. It states that the degree to which migrants and remittances can 
contribute to development in their home countries is limited, therefore it would be naive to 
think that migration could remove the constraints to development by itself.  
 
4.5 Migration and the family “left-behind” 
 
A second strand of literature, following the analysis of the effects of remittances, has 
started to analyze the effects on the family left behind, especially women and children.  
The literature on women left-behind finds mixed results. The study by Binzel and Assaad 
(2011) on Egypt finds evidence that women left behind from migrant husbands lower their 
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supply in the labour market for wage-work, especially in urban areas. At the same time, 
women in rural areas increase their participation in family, unpaid activities. Their evidence 
suggests that this labour supply response to male migration is driven by the need to replace 
the migrant man, rather than by a relaxation of the household constraints due to remittances 
inflows. The implications are that, in such case, there is no gain in social status and 
empowerment for women.  Their results are similar to the ones by Mendola and Carletto 
(2012). In their paper on the effects of migration on the domestic labour market in Albania, 
they find that the male dominated Albanian migration reshapes labour market supply in 
different ways for men and women: it increases the probability of unpaid work for women, 
and of self-employment for men. In another recent study on women in Egypt, Elbadawy 
and Roushdy (2010) find that empowerment of left behind women is controversial: it seems 
to be more due to the husband’s absence than to a real empowerment and improving in 
status. It is possible that the results are very context-specific in their nature. 
When looking at children’s outcomes, the underlying idea is that parental migration can 
entail negative outcomes for children left behind by one or both parents. The absence of 
parents may entail a psychological cost, and change the decision making power within the 
household. If a household member leaves, intra-household duties and responsibilities 
change and children may be asked to take on their parent’s duties (especially young males), 
and thus they may spend less time in school-related activities. Moreover, if one parent is 
absent, part of the parental effort of sending children to school and monitoring them is 
missing, while the remaining parent could be loaded with extra duties. Consequently, 
parental absence can result in school’s dropouts or in repeated grades. Parents’ absence 
may also require that children (especially older children) substitute their missing parent in 
household or agricultural tasks, so neglecting their schooling. Furthermore, we have to 
consider the disruptive effects on family structure that can lead to leadership changes. In a 
traditional settings, fathers  supervise children education, but if they are missing, it is likely 
that the decision power  shifts to older men in the household, less educated and less prone 
to understand the value and importance of human capital, especially for girls (Ginther and 
Pollak, 2004).   
In their study on children left behind in Albania, Giannelli and Mangiavacchi (2010) find 
evidence that father's absence negatively influences children's schooling in the long term, 
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increasing the probability of dropping out and delaying school progression. They also find 
that the impact is worse for girls than for boys, implying that parents migration can reduce 
gender equality and women empowerment in the long term. 
The evidence in this regard, however, is somewhat mixed: recent studies on Mexico by 
Francisca Antman find no compelling evidence of this type of negative effects. Antman 
(2011a), using a difference-in-difference analysis technique to address endogeneity, finds 
evidence that household where a father migrated to the U.S. are more likely to spend more 
on girls than on boys, and that this effect drops once the father returns. But she finds no 
evidence of a detrimental effect on education. In another study (Antman, 2011b) there is 
evidence of a reduction in school hours and increase in work hours for boys aged 12-15 
years old, but only in the short run. In the most recent work (Antman, 2012) she uses 
variation in siblings’ age at the time of parental migration to address the endogeneity issue, 
and finds that the father’s migration  has a positive impact on young girls’ schooling, 
especially if the father migrates when they are younger, while it has no impact on boys’ 
schooling. 
 
In a more general approach, the prolonged separation of children from their parents can 
have several detrimental effects. These effects are studied mostly in the field of 
psychology, but can, nonetheless, give a supporting framework for an economic analysis. 
Most studies find negative outcomes and risky behavioural patterns in adolescents who 
were separated from their parents, similar to the ones found for mobility.
31
  
A study investigating the effect of parental absenteeism in South Africa (De Wet, 2013) 
finds that adolescents are forced to forgo schooling and seek employment. Similar results 
are found among orphans in sub-Saharan Africa (Coneus and Mühlenweg, 2011), finding 
that orphans are disadvantaged with respect to non-orphans even in the same household.  
This results suggest that the absence of parents entails specific criticalities that need to be 
assessed in their own respect. 
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 Suarez-Orozco (2001), Cortes (2008). 
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4.6 Migrant children 
 
The last topic concerning migration and children’s outcomes is the analysis of migrant 
children. 
Apart from children who migrate in order to seek improved access to social services, 
migration often tends to have an adverse effect on migrant children, who face a number of 
obstacles in accessing quality schooling. Landau and Segatti (2009) find that this is the case 
for South Africa. And this is particularly the case for children migrating along, or illegally, 
or fleeing situation of conflict and violence. Even in this regard, however, results may be 
context specific. 
Harttgen and Klasen (2009) find positive effects of migration on education attainment in 
most surveyed countries. Hashim (2005), analyzing survey responses in Ghana, illustrates 
how migration can expand the opportunities for studying and apprenticeship for migrant 
children. This may be particularly relevant for Africa, where there are often structural 
obstacles in the access to education. 
In general, outcomes vary according to the destination, the age and the presence or the 
absence of parents. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The aim of this review was to present the findings of three strands of literature (migration, 
human capital and family decision mechanisms) in the same conceptual framework, in 
order to provide a more comprehensive benchmark to approach further research in these 
areas, and especially in the field concerning the effects of mobility on educational 
outcomes. As mobility and children’s education are both family decisions, and mobility can 
affect education itself, then it seems logical to analyze the two phenomena trying to take 
into account a broader framework and trying to assess the existing links. In this respect, the 
household economics framework serves as a theoretical background to construct the 
empirical analysis to address the effects of mobility on children’s outcomes. 
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As stated in the introduction, in the present work mobility will refer to an internal and 
temporary move, possibly of the whole family. The term “migration” will be referred to 
international individual migration from developing countries to developed ones. 
Decisions and processes of mobility and migration are difficult to tackle and analyze, 
because of their intrinsic nature: problems of endogeneity and self selection are usual when 
addressing empirical analysis of this phenomena. While the literature on migration is not 
new (it all goes back to the model of Harris and Todaro, in 1970), the recent work has 
focused more on the effects of the left-behind and in general on the effects of mobility on 
the most vulnerable members of the household. While the literature enquiring the effects of 
remittances seems to agree on a general positive effect on children’s educational outcomes 
(thus confirming the hypothesis of budget constrained households), empirical evidence on 
the effects of parental migration per se is mixed. A plausible explanation here is that results 
are strongly context specific. This is why more empirical research is needed in this area. 
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Chapter 3 
The Effect of Father's Absence on 
Children’s Education: Evidence from 
Egypt 
 
 
Abstract. This paper aims at exploring the effect of father’s absence on children’s 
educational attainment in Egypt. When a parent is missing, children are often required to 
provide extra help in the household, and there is an obvious lack of supervision on their 
school attendance. So far, empirical evidence for some countries, especially those with high 
migration rates, has shown a negative effect of parental absence on children’s education. 
Using data drawn from the Egypt Labour Market Panel Survey of 1998 and 2006, I 
estimate both a  generalized ordered probit with random effects and a ordered logit fixed 
effects for all educational levels. The results confirm the negative effect of father’s absence 
for children’s educational attainments, especially at lower educational grades. 
 
JEL classification: F22, I29 
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Introduction 
 
The aim of this study is to assess the effect of parental absence on children’s 
educational outcomes. This research focuses on the absence of the father, because absent 
mothers are very few.  
This work stems from the  two strands of literature on education and human capital and  on 
children’s well-being. A lot has been written about education and children’s outcomes: 
since Mincer (1976) and Becker (1975) works, education has become a central issue in 
development policies and growth theory, becoming a key feature in the Millennium 
Development Goals defined by the UN.  
Studies about children well-being in single-parent families in western countries typically 
deal with divorce related topics, and the findings are usually mixed (Pong et al., 2003). The 
issue is even more crucial for developing countries, because when a parent is missing, 
children are often requested to substitute for them, and take on extra work load in the 
household. Thus, school attendance and outcomes may be compromised. Typically, studies 
on this subject in developing countries are related to the literature on migration.  
The rationale for studying the absence of fathers in the Egyptian context also lies in the fact 
that Egypt has a long tradition of male outmigration, both to Europe and to Gulf countries
32
 
and therefore fathers are more likely to be absent from the household with respect to other 
countries. Assessing the effect of the absent of a parent can therefore indirectly contribute 
to the debate on the effects of parents’ migration on the welfare of children left behind. 
In a more general framework, fathers (or parents) leaving the household is a form of family 
mobility. The decision to move made by the father, whatever the reason for it, can affect 
children’s lives. In that respect, this analysis contributes to assessing the effects of parents’ 
decisions about mobility on their children. 
Data for this study were derived from the Egypt Panel Market Labor Survey, carried out by 
the Egyptian Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS) and the 
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Economic Research Forum (ERF)
33
. The results of a generalized random effects ordered 
probit model show that father’s absence has a negative effect on children’s school 
outcomes, especially at  lower grades.  As a robustness check, a fixed effects ordered logit 
model is also estimated, to control for individual effects. The results are less robust, but the 
effect of father’s absence remains. 
The work is organized as follows: section 1 presents the conceptual framework behind the 
analysis, while section 2 provides an overview on Egypt. Section 3 presents the empirical 
model and the data, section 4 presents and discusses the results and section 5 concludes. 
1. Conceptual framework 
 
The literature on the economics of education and human capital dates back to the 1960s, 
and it covers various economic aspects: from economic growth to signalling problems. 
From the seminal works of Becker (1964, 1975) and Mincer (1974) education has become a 
broad and important topic in the economic literature, and especially in development 
theories and studies. It was Becker who, in 1964, developed the human capital approach 
that shifted the economic analysis of education from a consumption approach  to  an 
investment one. Human capital has became the core of the economics of education.  
More recently, education has became a central issue in development studies: universal 
enrolment in primary school is the second goal in the Millennium Development Goals 
agenda of the United Nations. In particular, Glewwe (2002) proposes a model for schooling 
decision in developing countries: in his model, parents choose their children education, 
given the quality of school and the skills the children learn (that are related with their future 
salary - see Mincer, 1970 and 1974). Thus, it is possible to derive schooling choice models 
that contain elements of both demand and supply. This work focuses on the demand-side of 
the educational outcomes, investigating the effects of household characteristics on 
children's education.  
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Education, on the other hand, is also a part of a child well-being: UNICEF (2007) considers 
educational achievements as the third dimension of children’s well-being. In recent years, 
there has been an increasing number of economic studies about children’s well-being, as 
children have become a growing topic of research interest. Also, the well being of children 
raised in single-parent family has been a research topic in Western countries, related to the 
literature on the effects of divorce and the increasing rate of children born outside the 
wedlock. 
While the effect of being raised in a single-parent family may not be so detrimental, 
especially if public policies equalize resources (Pong et al., 2003) between single and two-
parents families, in developing countries it may be an entirely different story. De Wet 
(2010) finds that parental absenteeism in South Africa results in adolescents being forced to 
forgo schooling and seek employment. Similar results are found among orphans in sub-
Saharan Africa (Coneus and Mühlenweg, 2011), showing that orphans are disadvantaged 
with respect to non-orphans even in the same household.  
In this framework, the absence of parents may entail a psychological cost, and change the 
decision making power within the household. If a household member leaves, intra-
household duties and responsibilities change: children may be asked to take on their parent 
duties (especially young males), and thus they may spend less time in school-related 
activities. Moreover, if one parent is absent, part of the parental effort of sending children 
to school and monitoring them is missing, while the remaining parent could be loaded with 
extra duties. Consequently, parental absence can result in dropouts or repeating grades. 
Parents absence may require that children (especially older children) substitute their 
missing parent in household or agricultural tasks, so neglecting their schooling. 
Furthermore, we have to consider the disruptive effects on family structure that can lead to 
leadership changes. In a traditional settings, fathers supervise children’s education, but if 
they are missing, it is likely that the decision power shifts to older men in the household, 
less educated and less prone to understand the value and importance of human capital, 
especially for girls (Ginther and Pollak, 2004).  In their study on children left behind in 
Albania, Giannelli and Mangiavacchi (2010) find evidence that father's absence negatively 
influences children's schooling in the long term, increasing the probability of dropping out 
70 
 
and delaying school progression. They also find that the impact is worse for girls than for 
boys, implying that parents migration can reduce gender equality and women’s 
empowerment in the long term. Contrary to these findings, Antman (2012) finds, for 
Mexico, that girls are more likely to go to school if the father is missing. Overall, evidence 
on this topic is likely to be strongly dependent on the context, therefore more research is 
needed. 
2. The case for Egypt 
 
The interest in Egypt comes firstly from its belonging to the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) region, which makes it relevant for Europe, especially for the neighbouring 
southern Europe and countries.  
Egypt is a lower-middle income country according to the World Bank classification. In 
2012 the GNI per capita was 2,980 in current US dollars
34
 with a growth rate that went 
abruptly from 7.2% in 2008 to 1.8% in 2011, during the international economic crisis, and 
was 2.2% in 2012. Life expectancy was 71 years, and with respect to the human 
development, Egypt ranked 113 for its HDI
35
 in 2011.  
In recent years Egypt, as other countries in the region, has come to the international 
attention for the break of civil strife and protests against governments. Egypt is one of the 
countries that has experienced one of the strongest turmoil, which has entailed a series of 
consequences still at play. A political analysis of the uprising of the Egyptian population is 
clearly beyond the scope here, but the turmoil of the region all had one common factor, the 
“youth bulge”. A large part of the population is made of young people fuelled by the past 
high fertility rate, together with a reduction in infant and children’s mortality. In this 
respect, Egypt has possibly the largest population of the region
36
 with a growth rate that 
could bring it to over 100 millions around 2030.
37
 The “youth bulge” might represent an 
asset for the economy, if young people are fully employed and fertility rates decrease, so 
                                                 
34
 Atlas method. It was 6,450 $ in PPP (World Bank). 
35
 The HDI was 0,644 (UNDP). 
36
 Over 84.5 million people in 2013 (UN Population Division). 
37
 UN Population Division projections, 2012 revision. 
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that the dependency ratio
38
 can diminish. However, if youth unemployment is high and 
fertility rates don’t decline, than these countries face a “demographic bomb”. In Egypt, the 
dependency ratio was over 58% in 2012 (World Bank), and unemployment was 12.7% for 
the total workforce in 2012, while youth’s unemployment39, in 2010, was 14.10% for males 
and 54.1% for females. Even if it has been declining over the past years, it is still 
worrisome, especially since the decline in the fertility rate seems to have stopped in the past 
years (the total fertility rate was still 2.7 children per women in 2012). 
In this context, attention to education seems even more crucial for policy. 
Education in Egypt has become a priority in the government agenda only in  relatively 
recent years. 
Since the 90s, the Egyptian government has acknowledged the importance of education as a 
mean toward progress and economic growth, and it has developed a radical reform of the 
education system.
40
 More recently, the reforms planned for 2000-2005 included, among 
other things: (i) developing education infrastructure, (ii) developing high and middle 
schools to meet the needs of the labour market (iii) increasing the use of information 
technology in schools and universities (iv) establishing a national system for measuring 
education quality.  
Despite these ambitious goals, education in Egypt still faces several problems, of which the 
most compelling are effectively reaching rural and poor areas, and improving equity in 
access to education, especially among  women and girls. The latter would lead to the 
generalizing of compulsory education which is also one of the Millennium Goals to achieve 
within 2015.  
Egypt has certainly made progress over the last ten years, as the overall gross enrolment 
ratio for primary school is 109%.
41
 However, as shown in table 3.1, universal primary 
education yet is still far from being achieved. 
42
 
                                                 
38
 The ratio of the non-working age population to the working age population.  
39
 People aged 15-24. 
40
 World Data on Education, 2006-07, UNESCO. 
41
 World Bank, 2011.  
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Table 2.1: Net enrolment ratio in primary school.  
 2000 2009 
Overall 89.1 95.4 
Boys 91.7 97.0 
Girls 86.4 93.8 
Source: UN - Statistic Division 2011 (estimates) 
Moreover, not all the children who start primary school are able to finish it: there is still a 
4% of school drops-outs who do not complete primary education (Egypt official data). 
More importantly the ratio of girls on boys in primary and secondary education is still 
below parity, at the 96% level. Clearly Egypt has still a long way to go before 
accomplishing a real equity in access to primary education, and even more so for secondary 
and tertiary education. 
Education in Egypt relies on constitutional principles that: (i) state education as a right, and 
state the primary cycle as mandatory; (ii) guarantee free education in all State institutions; 
(iii) recognize the principles of equity and equality in education (the latter deriving from 
other general principles). 
After the 2001 reform, the Egyptian education system is structured with a nursery school 
from 3 to 5 years of age, then a mandatory primary school, from 6 to 11 years of age. Then, 
there is the preparatory school (general or vocational) from 12 to 14 years of age, which is 
also mandatory. 
Primary and preparatory school constitutes the basic education, compulsory for all children: 
it is a  9 years cycle, from 6 to 15, and covers the 6 years primary education cycle and the 3 
years preparatory cycle. At the end of the preparatory school, successful pupils are awarded 
a basic education completion certificate. 
After the basic education cycle, education proceeds in secondary schools. Secondary 
education lasts three years, and can be general or vocational. Technical education in 
                                                                                                                                                    
42
 Gross enrolment ratios are an imperfect measure, as they measure all people enrolled in school, regardless 
of age. 
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commerce, agriculture or industry is offered in a 3 years or 5 years program. Higher 
education can be accessed by everyone who holds a General Secondary Certificate, or by 
students who completed technical education with high grades.  
In Egypt religious schools (Al Azhar schools) are rather diffused: they follow the general 
direction for teaching periods and cycles, but give more emphasis to Islamic studies. In 
general, private institutions are acknowledged by the State, proven that they fulfil the 
general education standards. 
The second reason why Egypt is an interesting country to study the effects of parental 
absenteeism, is the long standing history of outmigration from the country. Even if this 
work doesn’t deal directly with migration, parental absence is clearly linked with migration. 
Egypt has been a country of emigration from the beginning of the second half of the XX 
century, but until the 70s migration was strongly controlled by the government. In the 70s, 
governments adopted an "open door" policy that gave way to a large flow of migrants, 
especially toward the Gulf and other Arab countries, where skilled and unskilled labour 
force was needed. The oil boom in the late Seventies was followed by a peak in migration, 
reached in 1979. The migration flows were so large in those years, that Egypt experienced a 
shortage of labour in agricultural and construction sectors, pushing up real wages 
(Wickham, 2002). 
Migration flows to Gulf states continued steadily until the late Eighties, when the First Gulf 
War forced Egyptian migrants to come back, and in the 90s, when Egyptian workers were 
replaced in those countries by large flows of Asian migrants. 
Nowadays Egypt is one of the Middle-east and North Africa countries with more emigrants 
abroad. Most of them are in the Gulf region, but an increasing share is moving toward 
Europe.  At the best estimates from bilateral statistics, in 2010 there were 3.7 million 
Egyptians living abroad (World Bank), over 2.2 million living in Arab states and Gulf 
countries (over 1 million in Saudi Arabia), and   about 200 thousand in the European area 
(including Switzerland, Norway and Finland). 
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From the Egypt labour Market Survey of 2006 it is possible to estimate that 3.8 million 
Egyptians lived in a migrant household, that is to say 4.8% of the households. That 
percentage is lower than the 9.9% of 1988, though part of the decline is to ascribe to the 
above mentioned steady increase in population. 
One characteristic of Egyptian migration is its temporary and male nature: it is mostly 
young men that leave shortly before or after marriage, to provide the necessary money to 
sustain their new families. Typically, these young men migrate to Gulf states, where they 
work in oil wells for one or two years, and then they go back to Egypt. 
This large number of migrants generates large remittances flows: Egypt is among the top 
ten remittances recipients, and the first in the MENA region: remittances constituted in 
2006 5% of national GDP. 
From the ELMPS 2006 data, we can see that the 4.54%  of the individuals lived in a 
migrant household, i.e. they reported having a household member living or working abroad. 
 
 Table 2.2: Migrant Household 
Migrant 
Household 
      Frequency            Percentage 
        Y s        1,686                4.54 
         No       35,454             95.46 
      Total       37,140       100.00 
Source: ELMPS 2006 
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3 Empirical strategy 
 
Data for this study were derived from the Egypt Labor Market Panel Survey of 1998 
and 2006, which is the first panel study of this scale ever carried out in Egypt
43
. The panel 
follows a nationally representative sample of 4,816 households visited in 1998, plus split 
households between the two rounds, plus a refreshed sample of 2,500 household, for a total 
of 8,349 households. In the panel sample used in this paper consists of the 4,816 
households that did not split from 1998. The ELMPS06 is the first panel study of the scale 
carried out in Egypt. 
The ELMPS contains detailed information on several issues: mainly employment, 
unemployment and underemployment. It collects data on job characteristics, mobility, 
earnings, and, in the 2006 wave, on migration and remittances. It also contains data on 
household characteristics and education. 
The 2006 wave features a lot more information than the previous one: detailed information 
on migration, on female employment and education were collected in this wave. 
Unfortunately, only a small part of this vast amount of data is compatible with the 1998 
survey. The panel thus focuses on a relatively narrower set of issues. Since this study is 
concerned with the effects of parents’ absence on children’s schooling, the analysis focuses 
on individuals that were 6 to 17 years old in 1998 so that the same individuals range from 
13 to 24 years of age in the 2006 wave.  The total sample is made of 4,253 individuals wich 
amount to 8,506 observations in the two panel years. 
In 1998, more than 90% of the children in the sample were in school, and more than 94% 
considering only children in primary (and mandatory) school (see table 3.1) 
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 Economic Ressarch Forum, online databases. 
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Table 3.1: Currently in School (1998) 
All children Frequency Percent 
Yes 3,829 90.12 
No 420 9.88 
Total 4,249
44
 100.00 
Less than 11yrs old   
Yes 1,622 94.08 
No 102 5.92 
Total 1,724 100.00 
Source: ELMPS 1998 and 2006 
 
That being the case, the "currently studying" binary variable does not seem to fit our 
purpose: moreover, since we're following up these individuals to their twenties, when many 
of them have naturally left school, it does not seem useful to use this variable for the 2006 
wave. Instead, it seems more suitable to use a factor variable for educational attainments. 
There several variables for educational attainments in the ELMPS, the simplest one, with 6 
classes of achievements, is used in the analysis: illiterate, read&write, less than 
intermediate, intermediate, above intermediate, university. For the sake of simplicity, we 
also created a 3 category variable was also created: 1 for children not having completed the 
primary (illiterate or only 'read&write'), 2 for intermediate or less than intermediate levels, 
and 3 for the above levels of education.  
The distributions for 1998 and 2006 are presented in table 3.2. 
 
 
 
                                                 
44
 Discrepancies due to a few missing values in the specific variables 
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Table 3.2 : Educational attainments, children aged 6-17 
  1998 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Incomplete primary 2,162 50.83 50.83 
Intermediate 2,090 49.14 99.98 
Above 1 0.02 100.00 
Total 4,253 100.00  
    
 2006 
Incomplete primary 511 12.02 12.02 
Intermediate 3,324 78.16 90.17 
Above 418 9.83 100.00 
Total 4,253 100.00  
Source: ELMPS 1998 and 2006 
 
From an even distribution between less than primary and intermediate, in 2006 to a clear 
concentration at the intermediate level is observed. It can therefore be concluded that most 
of the children in 1998 completed primary education, but the majority did not go above an 
intermediate level and only a few achieved a level of education above the intermediate one. 
For the father’s absence, a dummy variable derived from whether the child’s father lives in 
the same household was created.  All individuals of six years old and more where asked 
this question. The focus is on the father, because there are rather few cases of absent 
mothers. Unfortunately, there is no information either on fathers’ destination or on their 
motivation for leaving. It is only known whether they are missing from the household. 
More precisely, the question asks if the father actually lives in the same household as the 
respondent or not.
 45
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 Question 0113: “Does the individual’s father live in the same household?”  
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The observations in 1998 are 477, while they are almost double in 2006 (see table 3.3). One 
could object that the reason for this is that children, growing up, moved from their parents’ 
house. However, here only individuals that did not split from original household are kept, 
therefore this objection doesn’t apply. 
 
Table 3.3: Father lives in the same house, 1998 and 2006 
 Frequency Percent  
1998 
Yes 3,772 88.77  
No 477 11.23  
    
Total 4,249 100.00  
2006 
Yes 3,435 80.77  
No 818 19.23  
Total 4253   
Source: ELMPS 1998 and 2006 
 
Other covariates controls are sex, since it is well known that girls have a lower schooling in 
developing countries than boys, household size, since the more siblings there are, the less is 
the schooling each of them is likely to receive, a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the 
subject is son or daughter of the head of the household, 0 otherwise, and five regional 
dummies. Table 3.4 shows the summary statistics for these covariates. 
  
79 
 
 
Table 3.4: Covariates descriptive statistics 
Covariates Observations Mean St. Deviation 
Sex (1 is female)  8506          0.4315 0.495 
Age  8506          14.921  4.708 
Rural  8506           0.340 0.489 
Child of the head of HH  8506           0.941  0.235 
Father absent 8506 0.152     0.359 
Ever married 8506         0.014 0.116 
Area of residence:    
Cairo  8506          0.129 0.335 
Urban lower  8506          0.156 0.363 
Urban upper  8506           0.189 0.392 
Rural lower  8506          0.215  0.411 
Rural upper  8506          0.183 0.387 
Source: ELMPS 1998 and 2006 
 
3.1 The Model 
To analyze the impact of the covariates on the independent variable (education), I chose to 
use both a Random Effects Generalized Ordered Probit model and a Orderd Logit model 
with fixed effects are used
46
. This choice was due to the need of verifying whether the 
results were sensitive to the choice of fixed or random effects. 
The model is built on a latent regression as the binomial probit model: 
                                                 
46
 Ordered probit and logit models are used to analyze responses with an ordinal dependent variable, such as 
opinion surveys, attainments (as in this case),  tests scores and the like. In such cases it is not possible to use 
multinomial logit or probit, as they would fail to take into account the ordinal nature of the dependent 
variable. On the other hand, ordinary regression would treat the difference between each outcome in the same 
way (Greene, 2008). 
 
80 
 
 
         
 
where y* is unobserved. What is observed instead is: 
            
               
             
  
The assumption is that  is normally distributed across observations, and its mean and 
variance are normalized to zero and one, respectively. 
Ordered probit and logit measure the probability of each of the outcomes in the ordinal 
dependent variable, by simply assuming that the higher the score is, the better is the 
result.
47
 The most intuitive way to interpret the parameters of the generalized model 
(Williams, 2006) is to look at each sets of coefficients as "contrasting" the other categories. 
Hence, positive coefficients indicate that higher values on the explanatory variable make it 
more likely that the respondent will be in a higher category of Y than the current one, while 
negative coefficients indicate that higher values on the explanatory variable increases the 
likelihood of being in the current or a lower category.  
Generalized Ordered Probit allows us to release some assumptions. In particular, we can 
release the assumption that the marginal probability effects on the dependent variable are 
the same across each score ("parallel regression assumption"), and assume instead that the 
parameters are outcome-specific. What we have is a series of parameters for each outcome 
of the dependent variable. The parallel regression assumption is often violated in ordered 
probit models, that is why generalized ordered probit provides an alternative when such 
                                                 
47
 As usual in probit and logit models, the marginal effects of the regressor on the probabilities, are not equal 
to the coefficients, but to the probabilities derivatives of each outcome with respect to the regressors.  
Interpreting the coefficients of the ordered probit model is, therefore, not simple. 
(1) 
(2) 
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constraint is violated
48
. Due to the nature of the Maximum Likelihood function, the fixed 
effects model cannot be generalized, and it is estimated with a logistic function, rather than 
with a normal one. 
4 Results 
 
When looking at the coefficients, one should bear in mind how to interpret them: 
the first column contrasts results against the second category and the third, the second 
column contrasts the second and first category against the third. Therefore, a positive 
coefficient means that the higher the variable is, the higher the probability that the 
respondent would be in a higher category. On the contrary, negative coefficients mean it is 
more likely for the respondent to be in that category or in a lower one. 
 
4.1 Random Effects G.O.P. estimates 
 
Table 4.1 presents the results for all model specifications: three or six categories dependent 
variables, and with or without regional dummies.  As expected, the size of the household 
has a negative effect, as does living in rural areas. Being son or daughter of the head of the 
household has, on the contrary, a positive effect, but significant only in the six categories 
specifications. In line with other literature findings (see, e.g., Giannelli and Mangiavacchi 
2010), the absence of the father has a negative and significant effect on children’s 
educational attainments, in all model specifications. Being a girl seems to hold a negative 
effect only in the six categories specification as expected, given the fact the primary 
enrolment for girls is quite high in Egypt. It seems that, at lower levels of education, there 
are not significant differences between boys and girls. On the other hand, the coefficient for 
being a girl becomes positive and significant at higher levels of education. The explanation 
for this result could be simply a sort of 'self-selection', which means that once girls are 
                                                 
48
 However, one must be careful in using this model as it may involve some problems (f.e. negative 
probabilities), especially with small samples and complicated models. 
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allowed to go to school, they stay there and may have better outcomes than boys (indeed, 
this is a result observed where there  is no gender bias in education, as in developed 
countries). 
The negative effect of having ever been married is another result worth stressing. Although 
not a surprising one, its persistence in all specifications confirms that family duties early in 
life have a detrimental effect on educational outcomes. 
 Five macro-regional dummy variables were also added to control for regional effects. In 
this case  the rural variable has been removed, as it is collinear with the regional variables.
49
 
Adding regional variables does not seem to change anything in the sign and significance of 
the coefficients, though. The rural residence has a negative effect on schooling, especially 
in Upper Egypt as expected, as Upper Egypt is the poorest region in the country. The sign 
and significance of the other explanatory variables remain pretty much the same as in the 
previous model. Results are shown in columns 3 and 4 of Table 5.1. The results for the six-
categories education variable are in columns 2 and 4 of Table 4.1.
50
 
  
                                                 
49
 Regional dummies are: Cairo region, Alexandria region, Urban Lower Egypt, Urban Lower Egypt, Rural 
Upper and Rural Lower. Lower Egypt is in general more wealthy than Upper Egypt. The baseline for the 
regional variables is the Cairo region (being the richest among the six). 
 
50
 There are a number of missing observations, since there are missing observations for the education variable. 
However they are not systematic, and do not change the results. 
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Table 4.1: Random Effects Generalized Orderd Probit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 3-Categories 6-Categories  3-Cat. With regions 6- Cat. With 
regions Equation 1     
Father absent -0.322
***
 -0.368
***
 -0.319
***
 -0.353
***
 
 (0.0629) (0.0819) (0.0630) (0.0829) 
Child of Head of HH 0.174 0.359
**
 0.163 0.353
**
 
 (0.0893) (0.116) (0.0895) (0.117) 
Household size -0.0394
***
 -0.0571
***
 -0.0348
***
 -0.0538
***
 
 (0.00926) (0.0116) (0.00953) (0.0124) 
Female 0.0580 -0.177
**
 0.0570 -0.180
**
 
 (0.0421) (0.0594) (0.0422) (0.0594) 
Age 0.245
***
 0.155
***
 0.245
***
 0.156
***
 
 (0.00727) (0.00725) (0.00729) (0.00734) 
Ever married -1.843
***
 -1.326
***
 -1.840
***
 -1.313
***
 
 (0.160) (0.174) (0.160) (0.174) 
Rural -0.312
***
 -0.478
***
   
 (0.0443) (0.0606)   
Alexandria   -0.0190 0.0700 
   (0.0845) (0.126) 
Urban Lower   0.0765 -0.000506 
   (0.0807) (0.117) 
Urban Upper   -0.0171 0.0297 
   (0.0778) (0.108) 
Rural Lower   -0.225
**
 -0.262
*
 
   (0.0755) (0.105) 
Rural Upper   -0.401
***
 -0.639
***
 
   (0.0795) (0.104) 
Constant term -2.586
***
 -0.164 -2.617
***
 -0.225 
 (0.147) (0.183) (0.156) (0.198) 
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Equation 2     
Father absent -0.267
*
 -0.406
***
 -0.259
*
 -0.406
***
 
 (0.106) (0.0759) (0.107) (0.0766) 
Child of Head of HH -0.0198 0.184 -0.0240 0.165 
 (0.205) (0.110) (0.206) (0.110) 
Household size -0.0852
***
 -0.0719
***
 -0.0752
***
 -0.0698
***
 
 (0.0221) (0.0111) (0.0228) (0.0116) 
Female 0.418
***
 0.00857 0.416
***
 0.0136 
 (0.0821) (0.0539) (0.0824) (0.0541) 
Age 0.441
***
 0.213
***
 0.442
***
 0.214
***
 
 (0.0213) (0.00762) (0.0213) (0.00769) 
Ever married -0.996
***
 -1.531
***
 -1.000
***
 -1.545
***
 
 (0.265) (0.170) (0.267) (0.170) 
Rural -0.483
***
 -0.372
***
   
 (0.0924) (0.0555)   
Alexandria   -0.138 0.0468 
   (0.141) (0.108) 
Urban Lower   0.0842 0.112 
   (0.131) (0.102) 
Urban Upper   -0.142 0.0685 
   (0.135) (0.0981) 
Rural Lower   -0.450
**
 -0.177 
   (0.139) (0.0939) 
Rural Upper   -0.675
***
 -0.474
***
 
   (0.164) (0.0958) 
Constant term -9.944
***
 -1.420
***
 -9.971
***
 -1.498
***
 
 (0.526) (0.179) (0.534) (0.192) 
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Equation 3     
Father absent  -0.479
***
  -0.496
***
 
  (0.0824)  (0.0832) 
Child of Head of HH  -0.128  -0.148 
  (0.137)  (0.138) 
Household size  -0.0794
***
  -0.0766
***
 
  (0.0137)  (0.0142) 
Female  0.405
***
  0.414
***
 
  (0.0598)  (0.0601) 
Age  0.545
***
  0.546
***
 
  (0.0129)  (0.0129) 
Ever married  -1.577
***
  -1.596
***
 
  (0.169)  (0.169) 
Rural  -0.310
***
   
  (0.0634)   
Alexandria    -0.229
*
 
    (0.113) 
Urban Lower    0.163 
    (0.105) 
Urban Upper    0.0776 
    (0.103) 
Rural Lower    -0.212
*
 
    (0.101) 
Rural Upper    -0.390
***
 
    (0.108) 
Constant term  -9.546
***
  -9.583
***
 
  (0.286)  (0.297) 
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Equation 4     
Father absent  -0.290
*
  -0.288
*
 
  (0.119)  (0.120) 
Child of Head of HH  -0.0106  -0.0417 
  (0.230)  (0.231) 
Household size  -0.101
***
  -0.0901
***
 
  (0.0248)  (0.0257) 
Female  0.485
***
  0.475
***
 
  (0.0911)  (0.0918) 
Age  0.529
***
  0.529
***
 
  (0.0237)  (0.0238) 
Ever married  -1.052
***
  -1.060
***
 
  (0.300)  (0.302) 
Rural  -0.555
***
   
  (0.103)   
     
Alexandria    -0.0969 
    (0.159) 
Urban Lower    0.139 
    (0.147) 
Urban Upper    -0.110 
    (0.152) 
Rural Lower    -0.447
**
 
    (0.154) 
Rural Upper    -0.797
***
 
    (0.186) 
Constant term  -11.83
***
  -11.85
***
 
  (0.583)  (0.594) 
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Equation 5     
Father absent  -0.269
*
  -0.252 
  (0.129)  (0.132) 
Child of Head of HH  0.177  0.209 
  (0.263)  (0.264) 
Household size  -0.117
***
  -0.102
***
 
  (0.0277)  (0.0286) 
Female  0.393
***
  0.387
***
 
  (0.0975)  (0.0995) 
Age  0.613
***
  0.623
***
 
  (0.0285)  (0.0294) 
Ever married  -0.736
*
  -0.740
*
 
  (0.342)  (0.344) 
Rural  -0.449
***
   
  (0.110)   
Alexandria    -0.342 
    (0.177) 
Urban Lower    0.00259 
    (0.158) 
Urban Upper    -0.232 
    (0.163) 
Rural Lower    -0.500
**
 
    (0.164) 
Rural Upper    -0.670
***
 
    (0.198) 
Constant term  -14.11
***
  -14.30
***
 
  (0.712)  (0.747) 
N 8506 7126 8506 7126 
R
2
     
adj. R
2
     
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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As can be seen, the variable of interest, the absence of the father has negative and 
significant coefficients in all the equations, except for column 4 where it is not significant 
anymore. However, it is not strange that the effect looses significance at higher levels of 
education, since when children get older, parents influence (on them) is more likely to 
diminish.  
Looking at these results, it can be concluded that the presence of the father has an important 
role in children’s the educational outcomes.  
 
4.2 Fixed effects ordered logit estimates 
As mentioned before, the problem in using a RE estimate is that they depend on the 
assumption of the individual effects being normally distributed. 
On the other hand, the problem with fixed effects ordered estimators is that they are 
difficult to estimate, and they can raise several reliability issues. In the literature, several 
estimators for a fixed effect ordered logit can be found, while an ordered probit estimator 
with fixed effects is not available due to the specific form of the probit likelihood function. 
Baetschmann et al. (2011) provides an exhaustive review of such estimators.  
The more frequently used estimators for fixed effects ordered logit are the Chamberlain 
(1980) estimator, the Das and Van Soest two-step estimation (1999) , and the Ferrer-i-
Carbonell and Frijters (2004) estimator. In their review, Baetschmann et al. (2011) also 
propose an alternative estimator, derived from Das and Van Soest work, that they call 
“Blow Up and Cluster”, or BUC estimator. They find this last estimator to outperform the 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters estimator. Table 4.2 reports the results for both these 
estimators, where they are compared with the results of a random effects ordered probit.
51
 
As we can see from columns 1 and 2, the absence of the father is still significantly negative, 
although at a lower level of confidence. Also, marriage remains negative and significant, 
while the other covariates loose significance (except for age): this is clearly due to the fact 
that fixed effects are controlled for. The fixed effects model captures all individual 
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 Not generalized, contrary to the previous one. 
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characteristics in the fixed part of the error term, thus taking away explanatory power from 
other covariates. Proof is that in column 3, the RE model specification, household size and 
female remain significant, as they were before. 
Table 4.2: Ferrer-i-Carbonell Frijters, BUC and Ordered Probit estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 FCF
52 BUC53 REProbit 
    
Father absent -0.584* -0.585* -0.300*** 
 (0.259) (0.243) (0.0565) 
Child of the head of HH -0.485 -0.486 0.156 
 (0.436) (0.460) (0.0858) 
Household size 0.0566 0.0570 -0.0661*** 
 (0.0445) (0.0379) (0.00860) 
Female -0.275 -0.275 0.131*** 
 (1.222) (0.317) (0.0393) 
Age 0.432*** 0.433*** 0.264*** 
 (0.0150) (0.0153) (0.00693) 
Ever Married -2.068*** -2.069*** -1.826*** 
 (0.541) (0.510) (0.154) 
Cut 1    
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 Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters estimator 
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 Baetchmann estimator 
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constant   2.811
*** 
   (0.141) 
Cut 2    
constant   6.599
*** 
   (0.200) 
rho    
constant   0.330
*** 
   (0.0269) 
N 4626 4632 8506 
R
2    
adj. R
2    
Standard errors in parentheses* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
4.3 Clustered logit esitmates 
 
The last test of sensitivity of the results can be done using a clustered logistic regression 
and using the cross-section data, with lagged variables. Using a clustered regression at 
household level is equivalent to control for “family fixed effect”, using differences within 
household (see Antman 2012). As a result, there are fewer observations,  so results must be 
looked at with caution. In particular, here the lagged variable of the father having been 
away in 1998, when the children were younger, is introduced. The dependent variables in 
this model are the dummies for having completed primary school, or above. 
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The results are presented in table 4.3, where the A specification uses the current value for 
the “Ever married” covariate, while the specification B uses a lagged variable, that is 
having been married in 1998. 
Columns 3 and 4 show that being married has a strong negative effect on higher education, 
while it has no significant effect in specification 2, that is primary level of education with 
lagged marital status, and it has a positive and significant (at 10% level) effect in 
specification 1. In this last case we may think of a “reverse causality” problem: since the 
marital status is not lagged, it may be that, after completing at least primary school, people 
decide to marry. 
Given the use of a clustered analysis, there is no need to control for family wealth and 
welfare, as it is included in the clustering process. 
Table 4.3 Clustered logit regression 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Primary A Primary B Above A Above B 
     
Father absent in 1998 -21.60
***
 -21.49
***
 34.32
***
 35.46
***
 
 (0.741) (0.767) (1.646) (1.650) 
Female -0.320
*
 -0.267 0.639 0.646 
 (0.154) (0.154) (0.343) (0.345) 
Age -0.324
***
 -0.305
***
 0.782
***
 0.783
***
 
 (0.0309) (0.0296) (0.0817) (0.0825) 
Ever married in 2006 1.152
*
  -4.786
***
  
 (0.467)  (0.820)  
Child of the head 1.158 1.162 18.79
***
 19.42
***
 
 (0.783) (0.793) (1.036) (1.037) 
Ever married in 1998  0.101  -32.29
***
 
  (1.562)  (1.074) 
N 1394 1394 730 730 
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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5 Conclusions 
 
Children’s welfare can be severely compromised by the absence of one (or both) 
parents: children can be pressured to take on adults duties, to substitute for their missing 
parent, therefore spending less time in school and end up having worst results or dropping 
out of the educational system. Evidence of this phenomenon was found in Albania 
(Giannelli and Mangiavacchi, 2010) and the present findings confirm it: father’s absence 
has a clear negative influence on children’s education. The use of panel data makes it 
possible to control, to some extent, for unobservable individual characteristics, and we can 
consider these findings more reliable with respect to those derived from cross-sectional 
data. Still, more research is needed in this area. 
What is clear, is that parents’ absence has a negative effect on children’s education, and this 
entails a long term negative effects on human capital accumulation. Given the importance 
of human capital investment for development, this is a key issue for developing countries, 
especially for those with high migration rates. 
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Chapter 4 
The Effect of Family Mobility on 
Children’s Educational Outcomes.  
The Case of Uganda. 
 
 
Abstract. The present work tries to establish the connection between family mobility 
decisions and educational outcomes: family mobility is a household-level decision that has 
potentially disruptive effect of children’s lives, and thus on their outcomes.  Using data 
from the three waves of the Uganda National Panel Survey, school attendance for children 
aged 6 to 15 is analyzed in relation to household characteristics and two mobility variables, 
with an household average model with fixed effects. Results for school attendance are 
mixed, but they are in line with the literature: if children move, possibly to access better 
areas, the effect of mobility is positive, while the opposite applies when adults move, thus 
confirming the detrimental effects of adults’ absence. Results for school completion instead 
are not significant with respect to mobility. As a robustness check, additional estimates are 
presented for health and child labour, and also for the probability of children to be “idle”. 
Results are significant only for the last one, with mobility variables having the opposite 
effects with respect to schooling. 
In general, family mobility seems to benefit children if they are the ones who move, while 
the mobility of adults, also controlling for remittances, confirms the negative effects found 
in the literature. 
 
JEL classification: F22, I29 
Keywords: children, education, Uganda, mobility 
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Introduction 
 
This study aims to understand the relationship between family mobility (including 
all types of residence change) and children’s educational outcomes in terms of enrolment 
and completion of first grade and elementary school. School completion is taken into 
consideration as in developing countries dropout rates are usually very high. Education is a 
major issue for developing economies, and especially for African countries, where lack of 
infrastructures, institutional frailty and lack of government funds take a severe toll on 
reaching a universal and effective education. Yet, education is a key element of human 
capital formation, and thus of economic growth itself.  
The present work tries to establish the connection between family mobility decisions and 
children’s educational outcomes: family mobility is a household-level decision that has 
potentially disruptive effect of children’s lives, and thus on their outcomes.  
Mobility, in this respect, is a particular kind of family decision, which can affects children’s 
outcomes in different ways. In a context as the one of Uganda, we can expect mixed 
evidence, depending on what effect prevails: if the adults are the ones moving, than 
substitution effect is probably more important and overall effect on children education will 
be negative, but if children are moving in order to escape danger or to reach areas with 
better services, then the effect should be positive. Literature regarding children’s mobility is 
found mostly for developed countries, and the findings are usually of a negative effects of 
childhood mobility on children’s outcomes (see, f.e., Pribesh and Downey, 1999; 
Teachman, Paasch & Carver, 1996). On the other hand, studies on developing countries 
focus mostly on the effects of the international migration of parents on children. The 
evidence is mixed, with some authors (Antman, 2012) find no evidence of a negative effect 
on children left behind, while others find indeed a negative effect on children’s schooling 
(Giannelli, Mangiavacchi 2010). It is quite possible that results in this respect are very 
context-specific, and more research is needed on the subject. 
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Using data drawn from the Uganda National Panel Survey (UNPS), conducted in 
collaboration with the Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) program of the World 
Bank, the study investigates this relationship. All the three waves (2005, 2009, 2010) of the 
panel have been used, and school attendance for children aged 6 to 15 is analyzed in 
relation to household characteristics and two mobility variables. Because the two last waves 
are very close in time, variability is strongly reduced, the choice has therefore been to 
estimate an household average model with fixed effects. Mobility is accounted for at the 
household level with tow dummy variables: one if a child in the household has moved in 
the past five years, and one if an adult has moved. Schooling is investigated in terms of 
school attendance and completion. Additional results are shown for children’s health and 
child labour, as these issues are strongly related to education. The use of panel data allows 
to overcome the identification problem usually found when dealing with this type of issue, 
as people who decide to move may differ from the ones who don’t in ways that data cannot 
address, thus self-selecting. The use of longitudinal data prevents this problem, at least in 
part. This work adds to the literature in using newly available data, and investigating a 
country seldom studied in this aspect. Also, it adds in the investigation of  past mobility, 
which is a different concept from current migration (and absence) of family members: the 
use of a retrospective mobility variable, added to the use of fixed effects panel data, makes 
the results more relevant.  
Evidence shows that family mobility has a composite effect: if adults move, this has a 
negative impact on school attendance, while if children move, this has a positive effect. 
These results are not unexpected, as the major reason for moving is to reach areas with 
better services and opportunities, and also away from areas disrupted by civil violence. 
When adults move from the household, on the other hand, this has a detrimental effect, 
probably due to the lack of supervision and the substitution effect in household chores. 
These results are robust to different specifications.  
The paper is organized at follows: section 1 present the conceptual framework and the 
literature strand this study is part of. Section 2 presents the reason for Uganda as a case 
study. Section 3 presents the empirical models, while section 4 presents the data. Section 5 
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presents the results of education, and section 6 shows additional results on health and child 
labour. Section 7 concludes. 
1. Conceptual framework 
 
Mobility and migration are not perfect synonyms, even if their definition can easily 
overlap. Usually, migration refers to a permanent change of residence, with an emphasis on 
the international one, of one and or more household members. Mobility, instead, 
encompasses a more general definition of moving, and we could say that migration is a 
special case of mobility. Also, underlying the definition of migration is the notion of 
decision and choice, while mobility could not be a choice, in certain situations. While the 
literature on migration is very well established and  widespread, the literature on the more 
general notion of “moving” is  lacking, especially in economics, but, given that the two 
terms can, at least in part, be synonyms, the conceptual framework regarding migration also 
applies to this study. 
Migration decisions are usually treated, in economics, as individual optimization choices. 
The reference model for development economics is the Harris – Todaro one, that analyzes 
the choice of migration from rural to urban areas as an individual choice over the expected 
value of wages in a two sector economy (Harris, Todaro, 1970). More in general, the 
human capital model of migration (Sjaastad, 1962) treats migration as an investment, that 
has returns in the feature. This model consider a potential migration a parson that evaluates 
the future streams of benefits and costs (discounted over time) of living in any one of a set 
of geographical areas, and migrates if the area with highest net benefit is not the current 
place of residence (Cooke and Bailey, 1996). 
Mincer, in his work on family migration decisions (1978), analyzes the decisions of a two-
member family (husband and wife) considering the combination of each component's gains 
and losses, and he argues that net family gain motivates migration, rather than net personal 
benefit. He also points out why family ties can reduce family mobility and family stability, 
and that the spouses can have different benefits from moving (or no benefit at all), and one 
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of them may end up being a “tied mover” or a “tied stayer”, thus, he argues, family ties act 
like negative externalities on one of the two spouses. Empirical studies find that family ties 
are actually a major deterrent for family mobility, as childless couples and those with only 
pre-school aged children are the most likely to move (Nivalainen, 2004), and it is true that 
the most important pull factor is, in general, the husband career, while the wife becomes a 
“tied” mover, often becoming unemployed or underemployed, or exiting the labour force. 
These results were  in line with earlier literature, as, for example, the results from Sandell 
(1977) and Spitze (1984) who find that migrating wife often experience negative effects on 
their labour market outcomes. Different results are found in  Cooke and Bailey (1996), that 
finds a positive effect of family migration on women’s employment in the United States. 
On the other end, there is research evidence that frequent residential mobility during 
childhood can have adverse consequences for adolescent behaviour and development. In 
the last decade, some studies have shown that family mobility has significant effects on 
various adolescent behaviours, such as lower educational attainments (Pribesh and 
Downey, 1999), higher rate of school dropout (Teachman, Paasch & Carver, 1996) and 
risky behavior like drug and alcohol abuse (Hoffman and Johnson, 1998) or premature and 
promiscuous sex (South, Haynie and Bose, 2005), that often results in a higher risk of teen 
pregnancy (Sucoff and Upchurch, 2001). As migration is, in fact, mobility, we should 
expect the same kind of results in studies about migration. 
Literature regarding migration finds evidence of negative outcomes for children left behind 
by one or both parents: the absence of parents may entail a psychological cost, and change 
the decision making process within the household. If a household member leaves, intra-
household duties and responsibilities change, and children may be asked to take on their 
parents’ duties. Thus they may spend less time in school-related activities. Moreover, if one 
parent is absent, part of the parental effort of sending children to school and monitoring 
them is missing, while the remaining parent could be loaded with extra duties. 
Consequently, parental absence can result in school dropouts or grades repetition. Parents’ 
absence may require that children (especially older children) substitute their missing parent 
in household or agricultural tasks, this way neglecting their schooling. Furthermore, we 
have to consider the disruptive effects on family structure that can lead to leadership 
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changes. In a traditional settings, fathers  supervise children’s education, but if they are 
missing, it is likely that the decision power  shifts to older men in the household, less 
educated and less prone to understand the value and importance of human capital, 
especially for girls (Ginther and Pollak, 2004).  In their study on children left behind in 
Albania, Giannelli and Mangiavacchi (2010) find evidence that father's absence negatively 
influences children's schooling in the long term, increasing the probability of dropping out 
and delaying school progression. They also find that the impact is worse for girls than for 
boys, implying that parents’ migration can reduce gender equality and women’s 
empowerment in the long term. This result is in contrast with the one found by Antman 
(2012) for Mexican migrants in the U.S., where fathers’ migration results in additional 
education for girls.  
The other strand of literature in the background of this study is the one related to human 
capital formation and, in general, to children’s well-fare and well-being. Human capital 
formation, especially in its form of educational outcomes, has become an increasingly 
major topic in economics, as growth theories have assessed its role in economic growth. 
Education has become a central issue in development policies, becoming a key feature in 
the Millennium Development Goals defined by the UN. Education, however, is not the only 
component of human capital: health is also recognized as a fundamental component 
influencing individual human capital, and in a more general sense, everything that 
contributes to the acquisitions of skills could be included (as, e.g., natural ability, though it 
is difficult to measure). What appears clear, though, is that family background plays a key 
role in shaping adults’ future skills and abilities, and therefore professional capacity. All 
empirical works on education find that people educational achievement is correlated with 
their family socio-economic status, and most of the theoretical ones try to explain why this 
happens: from Becker (1964, 1975) on, several scholars have tried to explain how family 
decisions about resource allocation to children are made. In developing countries, a major 
problem is often the “supply-side” of education, i.e. physical infrastructure and personnel. 
Studies that tackle the supply side of the problem are needed, however it is usually more 
difficult to obtain reliable and comprehensive data
54
 on the educational system at a micro 
level, while micro-data on households and individuals are usually collected by national 
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surveys. The UNPS contains also a community level questionnaire, with questions about 
the presence and characteristics of different kind of public services and buildings, among 
which schools: including the latter in the model, however, did not result in any significant 
evidence, and such variables were therefore eliminated from the final specifications. 
2. The case for Uganda 
 
The choice of Uganda as a case study is justified by at least two motivations: the 
country geo-economical position, and the country complex society.  
First, Uganda is a part of Sub-Saharan Africa, an area whose economy still lags behind, at 
risk of becoming a “periphery's periphery”: even if poverty has been reducing in the last 
years,
55
 GDP per capita is still lower than the overall Sub-Saharan area, and Uganda ranks 
161st in the Human Development Index ranking, better than other countries in the same 
area, but still very low. Regarding education, gross enrolment ratios have increased in the 
past years well above one-hundred percent
56
 and falling back in 2011
57
, a year of 
“normalization” in school enrolment. Life expectancy is of 58 years: slightly above then the 
area average, but still well below the average for low-income countries. Also, at the 
beginning of the 21st century Uganda was praised as one of the World Bank’s “model 
pupils” in economic stability and in reducing poverty: Uganda was the first country to have 
a full PRSP
58
 program approved by both the World Bank and the IMF commissions, but the 
results were more disappointing than expected. On one side, the structural reforms started 
in the Nineties  took their toll on the population: the widespread liberalization and 
privatization of the agricultural market let to a worsening of the life conditions for a great 
part of the population, which still survives on agriculture and herding. On the other side, the 
fragile social and institutional context prevented the programs to act in the best way, 
especially the programmed government decentralization.  
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 24,5% in 2009, headcount ratio (World Bank) 
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 This is normal for the gross ratios, as they consider all children, regardless of age. 
57
 Enrolment ration in 2011 was 113% (World Bank) 
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The second motivation lies in the fact that Uganda has a very fractured society. Among 
Sub-Saharan countries, Uganda is probably one of the most divided, with ethnic, linguistic 
and religious divisions deeply rooted in colonial history: there are 53 officially recognized 
ethnic groups. Similar economic disparities apply to the North and the West-South region 
of the country, the latter usually the wealthier.  Civil strife is disrupting the country form its 
independence in 1962 and is still going on in the northern region since the 80s, due to the 
activities of three different armed groups: the Lord's Resistance Army, the West Nile Bank 
Front (WNBF) and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF): at the end of the nineties, it was 
estimated that between 800,000 and 1,000,000 people were killed in state terror, ethnic 
motivated violence and civil strife.  It is also estimated that around one million refugees 
were displaced from their homes over the years. This leads to an increased internal 
mobility, which is often forced by external pressure. Unfortunately, it was not possible to 
address this problems in the present work, as data on civil strife and violence at the 
household level present many missing values. It is of course much more difficult to tackle 
households and individuals that suffered displacement, but further research on this topic is 
certainly due. 
Another feature of Uganda is that international migration is a rather rare phenomenon, and 
more so international migration toward non-African countries: on a population of about 36 
million people, the biggest community of migrants from Uganda was in Kenya and counted 
roughly over 500,000 people in 2010.
59
 This problematic country thus offers an opportunity 
to study mobility issues at a household level. 
Uganda educational system is divided in seven years of primary education, followed by six 
years of secondary education, which are in turn divided in four years of lower-secondary 
and two years of upper secondary. After secondary, there are three to five years of tertiary 
education. Completing primary education is crucial to access secondary, as only children 
who have passed the primary examination can access any kind of secondary. Following the 
British model (Uganda former colonial ruler), at the end of the four years of lower 
secondary students undertake Ordinary-level exams (O-level).  While after the two years of 
upper secondary there are the Advanced-level exams (A-level). An alternative to lower 
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secondary education is provided by three-years technical schools. Also, graduated from 
lower secondary can enrol in Technical Institutes.  
This system has stayed much the same since the 60s, but in 1997 Uganda undertook a 
major reform program under the name “Universal Primary Education” (UPE) which aimed 
to eliminate the cost of primary education, with the goal of ensuring up to four children per 
family went to school. The program was a crucial political point, and therefore was 
implemented relatively fast. The first result of the program was a dramatic increase in 
enrolment, especially for girls. Deininger (2001) in his work evaluating the program, finds 
that UPE reduced drastically the income constraint for school attendance
60
 and highlights 
this as a proof that such programs are effective in poor countries where even a small tuition 
fee is an obstacle to school attendance. At the same time, a part of the program was devoted 
to dissemination, awareness building and decentralization at the local level. This has led to 
very good results in improved school attendance. On the downside, probably because of the 
fast pace of the program, quality of school didn’t increase at the same rate. Especially the 
students/teacher ratios increased sharply, and in 1999 about one quarter of the students 
failed the final examination in primary school. In general, the program can be considered a 
success, but the flaws in the program must be considered carefully, especially since, fifteen 
years later, the general situation doesn’t seem to have improved as expected. 
3. The estimation strategy 
 
The econometric analysis should verify the impact of family mobility on children’s 
schooling, both on school enrolment and on school completion. The use of panel data 
ensures a control for unobserved factors and self-selection, which are known issues when 
dealing with both educational outcomes and mobility: education is influenced by natural 
ability, an unobserved and unobservable factor, while families  with a higher propensity for 
moving may be, in fact, different from other families in a way that affects both moving and 
education, thus creating a self-selection problem: this is indeed the case when studying 
migration. 
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The basic model at the individual level is the following: 
                                                       
 
Outcome y of individual i of household j, at time t, is determined by individual 
characteristics X, the mobility variable at the individual level M, and household 
characteristics Z. The outcome here will always a dummy variable, both for school 
attendance and school completion. Together with the individual fixed effect uij, a household 
fixed effect, j, is also introduced. Households’ attitude toward education can vary across 
households in ways that cannot be captured by the explicative variables, because they are 
either missing (i.e. the dataset lacks a specific variable) or unobservable/immeasurable.  
The problem with this model, beside the difficulty to tackle both individual and household 
fixed effects over time, is that, as mentioned in the introduction, the second and third wave 
of the panel are very close in time, and variability in outcomes is therefore very low, as the 
dependent variable is a dummy and not a continuous one. 
To overcome these problems, the strategy is to estimate a household-level model, as 
follows: 
 
                                            
 
In this model, individual characteristics are substituted with household averages of the 
same characteristic, so that the outcome y is actually the average school attendance (or 
completion) of children 6 -15 in household j. It can also be interpreted as the household-
specific rate of enrolment, or as the probability for a child aged 6 to 15 in household j to be 
enrolled in school at time t. 
This model allows to take into account household effects (using a fixed effects 
specification), and solves the problem of variability: this model is indeed defined and 
(1) 
(2) 
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overall significant. The model is estimated through a linear probability model with fixed 
effects.  
Since the dependent variable is continuous but truncated both to the left and the right (it is 
number between 0 and 1), as a substitute analysis the model is also estimated using a two-
side censoring model for panel data
61
, which is useful when the dependent variable is a 
fraction, as it is in this case. The two-side censoring model is based, as censoring model in 
general, on the idea of a latent variable y* which conditions the observed variable y, so that 
we have: 
 
         
We observe: 
   
          
             
         
  
Where L and U are the lower and upper limits (0 and 1, respectively). 
Another way to estimate equation (1) is to treat the data as hierarchical with a multilevel 
model, according to which observations over time are nested in individuals, and individuals 
are nested in household. To account for both individual and household fixed effects over 
time, the choice is to estimate a mixed model with random intercepts for individuals and 
households, which capture the effects of uij and j. The levels are as follows: 
i= 1, … J  level 3, households 
i= 1, … Ij  level 2, individuals within household 
t=1, …Tij  level 1, observations over time within individual 
 
Thus, we can go back to the initial individual model in equation (1) and rewrite it as: 
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 Alan, Honoré et al., 2011, Estimation of Panel Data Regression Models with Two-Sided Censoring or 
Truncation.  
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
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Since these models are very demanding both in terms of computing effort and assumptions, 
the choice of the covariates in the fixed part has to be parsimonious. Conceptually, the 
“household averages” model is to be considered an equivalent, so that the multilevel model 
should be regarded as a further robustness check for the results. 
4. Data and variables 
 
The data for this study were derived from the three waves of the Uganda National Panel 
Survey, collected in 2005-06, 2009-10 and 2010-11. The survey is a part of the World 
Bank’s Living Standard Measurement Study program. The last two waves are close in time 
because they are also part of the Agricultural Census program of the World Bank, and 
therefore they have to tackle each season’s agricultural production. 
The three waves collect data from a national representative sample, and each one has the 
following number of observations: 
Table 4.1 Sample description 
Years Number of Households Number of individuals 
2005-06 3,058 16,759 
2009-10 2,919 18,734 
2010-11 2,530 19,205 
 
Due to sample attrition between panel waves, the final sample consist of 10044 individuals 
in 2391 households. 
The survey collects plenty of information regarding individual and households 
characteristics: socio-demographic, education, activity and consumption data. There is also 
a section devoted to migration and mobility history of the household where household 
members are asked questions about previous places of residence and length of stay in the 
current place of residence. 
107 
 
The problem related to this section of the questionnaire (section 3)  is that it changes 
slightly in the second and third waves, with respect to the first: to obtain a homogeneous 
variable through the three waves, the key mobility variable is a dummy that takes value of 1 
if the individual changed place of residence in the last five years.  
The dependent variables are the following dummies: school attendance at the time of the 
interview, for all children aged 6 to 15 years, completion of first grade for children aged 7 
to 15, and completion of elementary school for all children aged 11 to 15.  The distribution 
of these variables is presented in table 4.2. 
Table 4.2 Distribution of dependent and mobility variables. 
 2005-06 2009-10 2010-11 
Moved in the last 5 years (children 6-
15): 
absolute % absolute % absolute % 
Yes 183 5.88  334 9.52 248 6.97 
No 2,931 94.12 3,174 90.48 3,311 93.03 
Moved in the last 5 years (adult >15): absolute % absolute % absolute % 
Yes 695 14.96 441 7.99 364 5.89 
No 3,950 85.04 5,078 92.01 5,814 94.11 
Dependent variables 
Attending school (children 6-15) absolute % absolute % absolute % 
Yes 2,732 87.73 3,089 86.28 2,850 80.08 
No 382 12.27 491 13.72 709 19.92 
Completed 1
st
 grade (children 7-15) absolute % absolute % absolute % 
Yes 2,138 83.58 2,541 86.37 2,359 86.13 
No 420 16.42 401 13.63 380 13.87 
Completed Primary School (children 
12-15) 
absolute % absolute % absolute % 
Yes 258 11.92 267 11.01 241 10.72 
No 1,907 88.08 2,157 88.99 2,008 89.28 
 
As we can see, if  school attendance is generally widespread among young children, 
problems arise with the completion of elementary school. This phenomenon is well known 
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in developing countries, and it is partially due to the delay in enrolment and to grades 
repetition. However, for the most part, it’s due to children leaving school before completing 
the entire cycle. This, in turn, may be due to different causes: for example, as children grow 
up, their contribution to the family becomes more important,  but it could also be a problem 
of the educational system: fewer  teachers able to teach in higher grades, higher fees  etc. 
Usually, it is a combination of different problems, both from the “demand side” (i.e. 
households) and the “supply side” (i.e. the educational system in the country): here the 
focus will be mainly on the demand side, trying to establish a correlation between 
household and individual characteristics and school outcomes.  As mentioned before, 
supply-side variables were left out of the final specifications because they were not 
significant. 
Since the analysis is conducted at the household level, and the control variables are mostly 
household variables, the dependent variables are transformed into the household average 
rates of school outcomes
62
.  This also solves the problem of the individual specification 
models: because the last two waves are very close in time, and because the “yes” (i.e. the 1 
values) observations in the mobility variable are few for the children age group, the power 
of the individual fixed effect model, which relies on difference among different years, is 
very low. Using household level observations allows us to overcome this problem, and 
allows us to use all the household in the panel. Furthermore,  a fixed effect household 
model has the advantage to capture household-specific effects, which are crucial, given that 
children schooling is a family decision rather than an individual one. But it has, of course, 
the downside of losing child-specific information. With these caveats in mind, a household 
level model seems to be the best choice
63
. 
First of all, we have to define the new dependent variables, which are defined as follows, 
for each household -i: 



J
j
ji JySchooling
1
/  
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 As the variables are dummies, their average rates can also be interpreted as probabilities. 
63
 See Giannelli and Binci as an exemple 
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Where J is the total number of children aged 6-15 in the household, and yij= 1 if child j 
goes to school, 0 otherwise. The same method is used for all the three schooling variables, 
changing the denominator J as the age range changes. Also, this is how  all the other control 
dummy variables at the household level are constructed, always changing J according to the 
type of variable: basically, they are household averages of individual level variables.  
Consequently, the schooling variables can take three range of values: 
 Schooling = 1 if yi j = 1 for all j 
 0 < Schooling < 1 if yi j= 1 for at least one j 
 Schooling = 0 if yi j =0 for all j 
The base for the averages on schooling are: children aged 6 -15 for school attendance, 
children aged 7-15 for the completion of the first grade, and children aged 11-15 for 
primary school completion. 
A crucial point of the model  is to define  the mobility variables at the household level. This  
step poses a conceptual question, as mobility can be defined in different ways, and there are 
several ways to proxy this variable. The  solution that brings together the available data and 
the conceptual meaning, is to use a sort of “tag variable” at the household level that tags the 
household as “mover” 64, instead of an average which poses construction problems as, for 
example, the base for the average to be used, since one could argue whether to use all the 
members of the household, or only adults or children. Another interesting feature of 
addressing mobility in this way is that this type of variable tackles mobility in a 
retrospective way: the question about previous mobility is asked at the time of the 
interview, to each individual that is present at the time, i.e. individuals that have come back 
to their family and household (not in the same place, but within the same household). The 
variable doesn’t address family members currently living elsewhere, so this variable is the 
most close to an assessment of the household past mobility, which is the crucial point of 
this work. The mobility variables are therefore two dummy variables: the first one takes 
value 1 if at least one adult member of the household (aged 16 and above) moved in the 
                                                 
64
 The question is the number 9 in section 3 in the 2005-06 questionnaire: “Have you ever lived elsewhere 
since 2001?” and the number 15 in section 3 in the last two waves: “How many years have you been living 
here?” transformed in a dummy  with value 1 if the answer was <5 for compatibility reasons. 
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previous five years, and 0 otherwise. The second one takes value 1 if at least on child 
moved in the previous five years, and 0 otherwise. At first glance they could be almost 
perfectly correlated, for example if adults and children move together, but they are not: 
correlation between the two variables is 0.29, which can be regarded, in fact, as low. This 
tells us that adults and children don’t often move together. Also, as the two variables are 
used simultaneously in the models, each controls for the other. 
Other control variables are described in the following table, along with their descriptive 
statistics (mean and standard deviation). 
 
Table 4.3 Dependent and control variables, descriptive statistics. 
Dependent and control 
Variables 
Mean St. Dev. 
 2005-06 2009-10 2010-11 2005-06 2009-10 2010-11 
Dependent variables, household rates: 
School attendance  .534 .482     .306     .286 .265 .218 
First grade completion                    .635     .685     .686      .268 .247 .239 
Primary completion .124    .211     .222     .237 .277 .288 
       
Mobility variables: 
Moved child .095 .186      .189    .293 .389 .392 
Moved Adult .285 .235       .227     .452 .424 .419 
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Control variables: 
Child age               9.628 9.858     9.907     2.336 2.252 2.22 
Child age squared 98.156 102.246     103.061     45.385 44.579 44.755 
Child gender (1 is female)  .347 .33     .355     .276 . 257 .220 
       
N. of under 6               1.030    .986     1.013     .998 .993 1.010 
N. of adult           2.782      3.388    3.931     1.649 1.975 2.387 
N. of children 6-15               2.040     2.322     2.461     1.741 1.771 1.826 
Age of head                42.434     46.364     46.999     14.828 14.714 14.653 
Adults’ disabilities  .071     .335     .393     .149 .236 .233 
First expenditure quintile .199     .188     .215     .399 .390 .411 
Second expenditure quintile .206     .204      .206     .404 .403 .404 
Third expenditure quintile .212    .204      .199     .409 .403 .399 
Fourth expenditure quintile  .198     .188     .195     .399 .391 .396 
Fifth expenditure quintile  .184     .193    .183      .388 .394 .387 
Remittances log
65
        -.257     -.360     -.361     .546 .512 .512 
Education of adult women     .297     .287     .268     .420 .398 .377 
H. Head education: secondary .249 .239  .261    .432 .427 .439 
H. Head education: primary .159 .151  .167 .366 .358 .374 
H. Head education: less than 
primary 
.406 .421 .418 .491 .494 .493 
H. Head education: no 
education. 
.185 .189 .153     .389 .392 .36 
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 The natural logarithm of remittances includes both the value of local and international remittances (which 
are quite few), and is adjusted do address the problem of having logarithmic values of an initial 0 value. 
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Expenditures quintiles were calculated using the questionnaire section on household 
expenditures, and were divided by the square roots of the number of household members, to 
obtain per capita expenditures
66
. The average education of adult women is the probability 
of adult women in the household of having at least completed elementary school, and it is 
constructed in the same way as the previous averages. Average adults’ disabilities is 
calculated scaling the number of reported disabilities
67
 from adults in the household on the 
total number of adults.  
One puzzling feature of these data is the unbalanced gender distribution in children: only 
about the 35 percent are female. It could be due to a higher mortality rate for infant and 
young girls, but the data don’t seem to support this explanation, and mortality rates are 
actually higher for boys.
68
 It can therefore be a problem due to underreporting and sample 
attrition.  
5. Results for education 
 
5.1 School attendance 
 
Table 5.1 shows the results of the linear probability model of the average school 
attendance of children aged 6-15 in the household.  
As we can see, the mobility variable for children has a positive and highly significant effect 
in all specifications, while the mobility of adults has a negative effect, although a slightly 
less significant one. These results show that there is not a negative externality in the choice 
of moving, when the ones who move are the children. Moving benefits children, possibly 
because they move in areas with better services. Making their children move could also 
account for a different attitude of parents toward education, if they decide to make them 
                                                 
66
This is alternative to equivalence scale methods, that requires distinction between type of expenditures. In 
order to minimize the missing values and use all available data, this method  was preferred to equivalence 
scales. See OECD 
67
 Section 6 in the 2005-06 questionnaire, and 7 in 2009-10 and 2010-11. Adults are all people aged 16 and 
above. 
68
 Infant mortality rate is 70 for male and 59  for females. Under 5 mortality rate is 114 for boys and 98 for 
girls (DHS 2011, rates are in 1,000) 
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move in order to access better schools (or just to access school in general). On the contrary, 
when the decision to move involves only adults, this has negative effects on children’s left 
behind school attendance. As mentioned before, the two more probable causes of this result 
are that children substitute, in household chores and possibly work, for missing adults and 
that there is a lack of supervision when adults are missing. Also, the decision power may 
shift to older members of the household who don’t place a priority value to education. 
These results concerning adults’ mobility are in line with previous results and findings in 
literature, while results on in general report negative outcomes for migrant children, but are 
more focused on international migrating children. 
The other significant covariates have the expected signs, except for gender: being female, 
in average, seems to have a slightly positive effect on school attendance. The same result is 
found in other east-African countries, and evidence in therefore confirmed. At the same 
time, the specific result could be the effect of a slight selection bias, given the skewed 
gender distribution in the sample. This effect, though, only holds for general attendance not 
for completing primary or first grade, for which there is no significant difference between 
boys and girls.   
The number of children aged 6 to 15 in the household has a negative effect, showing that 
there is a competition for household resources: when there are many children, not all of 
them gets the opportunity to go to school. This could also be an effect of the above 
mentioned UPE reform, which made a goal to guarantee access to primary education up to 
four children per family. 
The education of the head of the household doesn’t have any significant effect, while the 
average education of adult women has a positive and significant one: this result is also in 
line with previous literature, which finds that mothers’ education is more important in 
predicting children’s schooling outcomes. The lack of significance of the household head’s 
level of education should not be surprising in a country where the general level of 
education is very low and, as a consequence, there are few observations of household heads 
having finished primary school. The only significant result, is, indeed, found for the low 
level of education, which means some primary. So, household whose head had at least 
some education are more likely to send children to school. It can be that the effect of the 
education of adults on children’s school attendance is indeed a discontinuous one, with the 
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most part of the effect deployed in having some education with respect to having none.  
Another interesting result is the negative sign of the rate of adult disability in the 
household: this result strengthens the evidence that children actively substitute their parents 
in household and family duties, such as assistance to disables and elderly. 
Household or general work is not included as a covariate because of endogeneity issues: 
children don’t go to school because they work, but they also work because they don’t go to 
school. Given the difficulty of disentangling this matter, and the fact that it could invalidate 
the model, children’s work is left out of these specifications. Separate results for child 
labour are found in section 6. 
  
Table 5.1- Household rate of school attendance - linear probability model. 
 Children 6-15 
 Model A Model B Model C Model D 
Av. Age of children 0.132
***
 0.128
***
 0.134
***
 0.134
***
 
 (0.0148) (0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0147) 
Av. Age of children sq. -0.00589
***
 -0.00576
***
 -0.00596
***
 -0.00596
***
 
 (0.000744) (0.000739) (0.000739) (0.000739) 
Child Gender 0.0486
*
 0.0542
*
 0.0457
*
 0.0479
*
 
 (0.0214) (0.0213) (0.0213) (0.0213) 
Age of head 0.000164 0.000488 0.0000614  
 (0.000840) (0.000836) (0.000834)  
N. children 0-5 0.00250 0.00500 0.0128
*
 0.0125
*
 
 (0.00529) (0.00527) (0.00544) (0.00547) 
N. children 6-15 -0.0771
***
 -0.0799
***
 -0.0777
***
 -0.0780
***
 
 (0.00407) (0.00407) (0.00404) (0.00406) 
2
nd
 Expenditures Quintile  0.0267
*
 0.0290
*
 0.0241
*
 0.0234 
 (0.0121) (0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0120) 
3
rd
 Expenditures Quintile  0.0192 0.0225 0.0179 0.0171 
 (0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0129) (0.0130) 
4
th
 Expenditures Quintile  0.0514
***
 0.0559
***
 0.0477
***
 0.0472
***
 
 (0.0144) (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0143) 
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5
th
 Expenditures Quintile  0.0253 0.0343
*
 0.0223 0.0229 
 (0.0170) (0.0170) (0.0169) (0.0169) 
Log of Remittances 0.00898 0.00769 0.0103 0.00999 
 (0.00830) (0.00825) (0.00824) (0.00825) 
At least 1 Moved child 0.0397
***
 0.0384
***
 0.0376
***
 0.0351
**
 
 (0.0114) (0.0113) (0.0113) (0.0113) 
At least 1 Moved adult -0.0260
*
 -0.0162 -0.0306
**
 -0.0309
**
 
 (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0104) (0.0104) 
Women’s Education 0.0616*** 0.0606*** 0.0422* 0.0337 
 (0.0170) (0.0169) (0.0171) (0.0175) 
Wave 2005-06 0.212
***
 0.182
***
 0.156
***
 0.151
***
 
 (0.00882) (0.00982) (0.0119) (0.0112) 
Wave 2009-10 0.165
***
 0.153
***
 0.155
***
 0.151
***
 
 (0.00711) (0.00731) (0.00720) (0.00724) 
N. adults  -0.0219
***
   
  (0.00332)   
Av. disability   -0.179
***
 -0.181
***
 
   (0.0260) (0.0263) 
Head low ed.    0.00184 
    (0.0182) 
Head primary ed.    -0.0132 
    (0.0233) 
Head sec. ed.    -0.0290 
    (0.0259) 
Constant term -0.237
**
 -0.134 -0.169
*
 -0.151
*
 
 (0.0808) (0.0818) (0.0809) (0.0725) 
N
69
 5208 5208 5207 5159 
R
2
 0.323 0.332 0.332 0.329 
adj. R
2
 -0.097 -0.083 -0.082 -0.095 
Standard errors in parentheses* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
                                                 
69
 Number of observations is the number of households. The number may vary in different specifications due 
to missing values in the covariates. 
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Table 5.2 shows the results for the two-side censoring model, which confirms the previous 
results, except for disability: because of the low values of the variable, due to relatively 
fewer observations, this particular specification could not be run with this model. 
Everything else remains the same, thus confirming the findings of the linear probability 
model. 
 
Table 5.2 – Household rate of school attendance - two side censoring model 
Children 6-15 
 Model A Model B Model C 
Av. Age of children 0.152
***
 0.149
***
 0.151
***
 
 (0.0282) (0.0276) (0.0282) 
Av. Age of children sq. -0.00666
***
 -0.00662
***
 -0.00659
***
 
 (0.00139) (0.00135) (0.00139) 
Child Gender 0.0778 0.0793 0.0810 
 (0.0420) (0.0412) (0.0421) 
Age of head 0.000515 0.000857  
 (0.00110) (0.00104)  
N. children 0-5 -0.00244 0.000702 -0.00314 
 (0.00636) (0.00644) (0.00643) 
N. children 6-15 -0.0909
***
 -0.0958
***
 -0.0912
***
 
 (0.00546) (0.00568) (0.00551) 
2
nd
 Expenditures Quintile  0.0215 0.0231 0.0211 
 (0.0151) (0.0150) (0.0151) 
3
rd
 Expenditures Quintile  0.00876 0.0122 0.00739 
 (0.0162) (0.0161) (0.0162) 
4
th
 Expenditures Quintile  0.0427
*
 0.0469
**
 0.0414
*
 
 (0.0170) (0.0170) (0.0169) 
5
th
 Expenditures Quintile  0.00970 0.0203 0.0116 
 (0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0194) 
Log of Remittances 0.00588 0.00507 0.00532 
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 (0.00974) (0.00981) (0.00978) 
At least 1 Moved child 0.0451
***
 0.0443
***
 0.0427
***
 
 (0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0129) 
At least 1 Moved adult -0.0317
**
 -0.0224 -0.0323
**
 
 (0.0115) (0.0116) (0.0117) 
Women’s Education 0.0814*** 0.0807*** 0.0729*** 
 (0.0190) (0.0187) (0.0194) 
Wave 2005-06 0.256
***
 0.223
***
 0.249
***
 
 (0.0111) (0.0125) (0.00960) 
Wave 2009-10 0.196
***
 0.182
***
 0.190
***
 
 (0.00780) (0.00820) (0.00772) 
N. adults    
  -0.0242
***
  
Av. disability  (0.00412)  
   -0.00862 
Head low ed.   (0.0210) 
   -0.0210 
Head primary ed.   (0.0250) 
   -0.0350 
Head sec. ed.   (0.0296) 
N 5208 5208 5160 
Standard errors in parentheses* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
5.2 First grade and primary completion. 
 
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 show the results for first grade and primary completion. As we can see, 
many covariates loose significance, among which the mobility variable: there is no 
evidence of any mobility effect on completing either the first grade or primary school. This 
results seems to validate the hypothesis of parents moving children to reach better services 
area, so that they may enrol them in school. On the other hand, moving doesn’t have a 
negative effect, either: there is no evidence of any sort of disruptive effect of children 
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completing school.
70
 In fact, as it is often the case in many low income countries, it is 
possible that the problem in completing school is much more due to a low school quality, 
with schools lacking infrastructure and qualified staff. 
As before, the presence of children aged 6 to 15 in the household keeps a negative effect, 
confirming that competition over  the household resources is a major obstacle in children 
education. 
Table 5.3 shows the results for completing first grade, and table 5.4 for primary school. 
 
Table 5.3 – Household rate of completion of first grade - linear probability model 
Children 7-15 
 Model A Model B 
Av. Age of children -0.0691
**
 -0.0694
**
 
 (0.0221) (0.0222) 
Av. Age of children sq. 0.00338
**
 0.00340
**
 
 (0.00105) (0.00105) 
Child Gender 0.0423 0.0413 
 (0.0243) (0.0243) 
Age of head -0.00979 -0.0115 
 (0.0113) (0.0114) 
N. children 0-5 -0.00497 -0.00272 
 (0.0106) (0.0107) 
N. children 6-15 0.000202  
 (0.000886)  
2
nd
 Expenditures Quintile  0.00000390 -0.000560 
 (0.00531) (0.00534) 
3
rd
 Expenditures Quintile  -0.0709
***
 -0.0710
***
 
 (0.00401) (0.00405) 
4
th
 Expenditures Quintile  -0.00388 -0.00315 
 (0.0123) (0.0123) 
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 As the Two-side censoring model confirms the findings of the linear probability model, it will be left out 
from now on.  
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5
th
 Expenditures Quintile  0.0135 0.0142 
 (0.0133) (0.0133) 
Log of Remittances 0.0000688 0.00212 
 (0.0145) (0.0146) 
At least 1 Moved child 0.0111 0.0113 
 (0.0172) (0.0172) 
At least 1 Moved adult -0.00154 -0.00150 
 (0.00833) (0.00839) 
Women’s Education 0.0322 0.0358
*
 
 (0.0172) (0.0176) 
Wave 2005-06 -0.0763
***
 -0.0766
***
 
 (0.00906) (0.00809) 
Wave 2009-10 -0.0102 -0.00884 
 (0.00704) (0.00711) 
N. adults  0.0359 
  (0.0184) 
Av. disability  0.0218 
  (0.0235) 
Head low ed.  0.0250 
  (0.0263) 
Head primary ed. 1.217
***
 1.201
***
 
 (0.121) (0.114) 
N 4497 4470 
R
2
 0.180 0.182 
adj. R
2
 -0.397 -0.401 
Standard errors in parentheses* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
In the next table, results are similar as the previous ones: no significant effect of mobility, 
either positive nor negative, for both adults and children. Again, the number of children in 
the household has a negative effect on completing primary school. 
The difference from the previous results is that the average education of adult women in the 
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household is now highly significant and positive: in line with literature findings, we see 
here that women education plays a crucial role not only in school enrolment, but also in 
school completion. Investing in girls and women education its confirmed to be one of the 
most important and effective policy to undertake to improve overall education and reach 
the Millennium Development Goals on education.  
 
Table 5.4 – Household rate of completion of Primary school - linear probability model 
Children 11-15 
 Model A Model B 
Av. Age of children -0.106
**
 -0.107
**
 
 (0.0362) (0.0362) 
Av. Age of children sq. 0.00476
**
 0.00480
**
 
 (0.00164) (0.00164) 
Child Gender 0.0269 0.0290 
 (0.0322) (0.0321) 
Age of head -0.000871  
 (0.00111)  
N. children 0-5 0.00139 0.00199 
 (0.00660) (0.00659) 
N. children 6-15 -0.0255
***
 -0.0257
***
 
 (0.00491) (0.00491) 
2
nd
 Expenditures Quintile  -0.00161 -0.00182 
 (0.0153) (0.0153) 
3
rd
 Expenditures Quintile  0.0189 0.0177 
 (0.0164) (0.0164) 
4
th
 Expenditures Quintile  0.0209 0.0207 
 (0.0177) (0.0177) 
5
th
 Expenditures Quintile  0.0340 0.0331 
 (0.0207) (0.0207) 
Log of Remittances 0.000629 0.00232 
 (0.0101) (0.0101) 
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At least 1 Moved child 0.00563 0.00653 
 (0.0137) (0.0136) 
At least 1 Moved adult 0.0212 0.0200 
 (0.0130) (0.0129) 
Women’s Education 0.144
***
 0.138
***
 
 (0.0211) (0.0213) 
Wave 2005-06 -0.153
***
 -0.147
***
 
 (0.0115) (0.0100) 
Wave 2009-10 -0.0295
***
 -0.0257
**
 
 (0.00840) (0.00839) 
N. adults  0.00615 
  (0.0211) 
Av. disability  0.0381 
  (0.0215) 
Head low ed.  0.0337 
  (0.0241) 
Head primary ed. 0.869
***
 0.801
***
 
 (0.203) (0.196) 
N 3602 3604 
R
2
 0.163 0.167 
adj. R
2
 -0.535 -0.529 
Standard errors in parentheses
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
 
The last table (table 5.5) presents the results from the estimation of the multilevel 
model: as explained before, the covariates are fewer than in the previous models. Still, 
the effects of children’s mobility is confirmed to be significantly positive, while adults 
mobility lost its importance. It should be reminded that the model estimated with the 
mixed procedure is an individual one, no more an household averages one. The first 
column shows the results of a mixed logit model, while the second the results of a 
mixed linear model.  
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Table 5.5 - Mixed model with 3 levels, schooling 
 
 ML logit Mixed linear 
   
Female 0.198 0.0143 
 (0.121) (0.00860) 
Age 2.560
***
 0.210
***
 
 (0.199) (0.0111) 
Age sq. -0.113
***
 -0.00919
***
 
 (0.00927) (0.000531) 
N. children 0-5 in the H -0.559
***
 -0.0454
***
 
 (0.157) (0.0128) 
At least 1 moved child 0.750
***
 0.0449
***
 
 (0.188) (0.0119) 
At least 1 moved adult -0.0277 -0.00230 
 (0.154) (0.0108) 
2009 -0.157 -0.0128 
 (0.108) (0.00758) 
Constant term -10.33
***
 -0.247
***
 
 (0.893) (0.0557) 
Lev 1 cons 0.363 -1.873 
 (4.077) (4.141) 
Lev 2 cons 0.256 -3.273 
 (5.041) (68.03) 
Sigma e  -1.285
***
 
  (0.0167) 
N 6240 6240 
Standard errors in parentheses
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
 
These results seem to point in the direction of parents making indeed a rational decision 
when moving their children, probably to have access to education. In this context, the 
possibility to overcome infrastructural problems seems to prevail over the possible 
disruptive effect of moving. At the same time, adults moving seems to have either no 
effect or, when it does, a negative one, thus confirming previous findings.  
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6. Additional results for health and child labour 
 
Education is only a part of the general formation of human capital. As argued by many 
researchers in recent years, it could as well be the smallest part of the process. One 
important factor of human capital is health, as health conditions affect the possibility for a 
child to obtain education, and to participate in the normal activities that contribute to the 
formation of skills and abilities
71
.  
The other phenomenon endangering human capital formation, especially in developing 
countries is child labour
72
. Unfortunately, while the subject of a broad literature, the causes 
and consequences of child labour are difficult to assess, as the definition itself of “labour” 
can be questionable in many regards. Furthermore, child labour is difficult to tackle in 
surveys, as it is often labour in the household of the family farm or business, and therefore 
often it is not recorded as labour, because it is not regarded as such by family members. 
Nonetheless, surveys are becoming ever more precise to overcome this difficulties, and data 
are now more reliable. In the UNPS there are several questions regarding household 
members’ activities, detailed in hours per week, and divided in both domestic and market 
(paid or not) activities.   
UNICEF defines child labour as follows: 
“A child is considered to be involved in child labour activities under the following 
classification: (a) children 5 to 11 years of age that during the week preceding the survey 
did at least one hour of economic activity or at least 28 hours of domestic work, and (b) 
children 12 to 14 years of age that during the week preceding the survey did at least 14 
hours of economic activity or at least 42 hours of economic activity and domestic work 
combined.”  
Allowing for a bit more of leeway, here children (aged 6-15) are defined as engaged in 
labour if they did more 20 hours combined of housework or market work (paid or unpaid). 
                                                 
71
 See Becker (2007). 
72
 See, for all, Basu and Van (1998). 
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It is a more loose definition than the one by UNICEF, and it has been chosen in order to be 
more inclusive or children’s activities. 
As both child labour and health presents problem of endogeneity when analyzed together 
with schooling, the analysis have been done separately. 
Table 6.1 shows the results for the health variable. The dependent variable is the probability 
for a child, aged 6 to 15, to have been injured or ill in the moth previous to the survey. 
Controls variable are the same as in the schooling model. Mobility doesn’t seem to have 
any significant effect on the child’s health. As we can see, being female has a negative 
effect on health, as it increase the probability of being ill or injured. Surprisingly, the 
number of children in school age range has a positive effect on health (i.e. a negative one 
on the dependent variable), it could be an effect due to increased rate of survival: healthier 
children have a higher probability of surviving to school age. The positive effect of 
remittances log could be due to an endogeneity problem, if remittances are sent to help the 
family in need. The same can be said for the expenditures quintiles. In general, is difficult 
to establish a causal link for health, as reverse causality is always looming over the results, 
so they are to be taken with a caution. 
Table 6.1:Household rate of  illness/injury - Linear probability model 
Children 6-15 
 
 Model A Model B Model C Model D 
Av. Age of children -0.0785
***
 -0.0790
***
 -0.0795
***
 -0.0814
***
 
 (0.0166) (0.0167) (0.0166) (0.0166) 
Av. Age of children sq. 0.00357
***
 0.00358
***
 0.00363
***
 0.00372
***
 
 (0.000837) (0.000838) (0.000833) (0.000835) 
Child Gender 0.100
***
 0.101
***
 0.103
***
 0.106
***
 
 (0.0244) (0.0244) (0.0243) (0.0242) 
Age of head -0.000516 -0.000482 -0.000379  
 (0.000966) (0.000968) (0.000961)  
N. children 0-5 0.0129
*
 0.0132
*
 0.00325 0.00341 
 (0.00595) (0.00596) (0.00614) (0.00615) 
N. children 6-15 -0.0319
***
 -0.0322
***
 -0.0313
***
 -0.0310
***
 
 (0.00456) (0.00459) (0.00454) (0.00455) 
2
nd
 Expenditures Quintile  0.0334
*
 0.0336
*
 0.0352
**
 0.0348
*
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 (0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0135) (0.0135) 
3
rd
 Expenditures Quintile  0.0249 0.0252 0.0252 0.0249 
 (0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0147) 
4
th
 Expenditures Quintile  0.0315 0.0320
*
 0.0340
*
 0.0331
*
 
 (0.0162) (0.0163) (0.0162) (0.0162) 
5
th
 Expenditures Quintile  0.0358 0.0367 0.0368 0.0352 
 (0.0192) (0.0192) (0.0191) (0.0191) 
Log of Remittances 0.0269
**
 0.0267
**
 0.0255
**
 0.0257
**
 
 (0.00935) (0.00936) (0.00931) (0.00931) 
At least 1 Moved child 0.0106 0.0105 0.0124 0.0120 
 (0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0126) (0.0126) 
At least 1 Moved adult -0.0210 -0.0201 -0.0165 -0.0163 
 (0.0118) (0.0119) (0.0117) (0.0117) 
Women’s Education -0.00955 -0.00972 0.00690 0.00809 
 (0.0191) (0.0191) (0.0192) (0.0195) 
Wave 2005-06 0.0228
*
 0.0199 0.0763
***
 0.0785
***
 
 (0.00997) (0.0112) (0.0135) (0.0127) 
Wave 2009-10 0.0366
***
 0.0353
***
 0.0462
***
 0.0464
***
 
 (0.00800) (0.00829) (0.00813) (0.00813) 
N. adults  -0.00217   
  (0.00376)   
Av. disability   0.173
***
 0.173
***
 
   (0.0298) (0.0298) 
Head low ed.    -0.0275 
    (0.0187) 
Head primary ed.    -0.00224 
    (0.0189) 
Head sec. ed.    -0.00142 
    (0.0220) 
Constant term 0.683
***
 0.693
***
 0.617
***
 0.630
***
 
 (0.0914) (0.0931) (0.0917) (0.0816) 
N 5226 5226 5225 5228 
R
2
 0.072 0.072 0.082 0.083 
adj. R
2
 -0.511 -0.511 -0.495 -0.494 
Standard errors in parentheses* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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The same kind of caveat applies to the results for child labour, displayed in table 6.2. 
As we can see, there are almost no significant results, and, more strikingly they do not 
mirror to the ones found for schooling. The conclusion could be that in the specific context 
schooling and child labour are not substitutes. It could also be that in very poor context 
children don’t even work, as there is nothing or little to work on. It is interesting to note 
that the average rate of disabilities in adults makes it less likely for a child to work, 
meaning that probably children are preferred to look after family members. Also, the 
number of adults reduces the probability of working, which in turn points toward a 
substitution effect in duties between children and parents. 
As suggested in the above paragraph, one of the main problems in poor developing 
countries is not only child labour, but children not doing actually anything: neither 
working,  nor attending school. Because the results discussed above pointed in that 
direction, estimation have been made also for the average probability at the household 
level, for a child aged 6 to 15, to be “idle”, i.e. to neither work nor go to school. Table 6.3 
shows the results for these estimations. 
The number of younger siblings and children living in the same household decreases the 
probability of being idle, validating to some extent the general assumptions that older 
children usually care for younger ones, or that they substitute their parents (usually the 
mother) in household chores while they care for the youngest children. Opposite and 
complementary to the previous result, average disability rate in household adults increase 
the probability of being idle. And the same kind of opposition and complementarities with 
schooling can be found for women education. 
As for mobility results, we can find the mirrored results: moving adults results in an 
increased probability of neither attending school nor working, while the opposite is true for 
children having moved. Also, while for school expenditure quintiles where less significant, 
here they are all significantly negative.  
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Table 6.2 – Household rate of child labour -  Linear probability model 
Children 6-15 
 
 Model A Model B Model C Model D 
Av. Age of children -0.0581
***
 -0.0662
***
 -0.0578
***
 -0.0570
***
 
 (0.0118) (0.0114) (0.0117) (0.0117) 
Av. Age of children sq. 0.00322
***
 0.00345
***
 0.00320
***
 0.00315
***
 
 (0.000592) (0.000571) (0.000586) (0.000587) 
Child Gender -0.000323 0.00948 -0.00294 -0.00218 
 (0.0170) (0.0165) (0.0169) (0.0168) 
Age of head -0.000488 0.000138 -0.000597  
 (0.000670) (0.000648) (0.000664)  
N. children 0-5 -0.00831
*
 -0.00379 0.000708 0.000560 
 (0.00418) (0.00404) (0.00430) (0.00429) 
N. children 6-15 -0.00267 -0.00775
*
 -0.00333 -0.00329 
 (0.00324) (0.00314) (0.00321) (0.00321) 
2
nd
 Expenditures Quintile  0.0208
*
 0.0251
**
 0.0186 0.0190
*
 
 (0.00964) (0.00930) (0.00955) (0.00955) 
3
rd
 Expenditures Quintile  0.0105 0.0165 0.00962 0.0102 
 (0.0104) (0.0100) (0.0103) (0.0103) 
4
th
 Expenditures Quintile  0.00628 0.0146 0.00324 0.00328 
 (0.0115) (0.0111) (0.0114) (0.0114) 
5
th
 Expenditures Quintile  0.00211 0.0183 0.000350 -0.000550 
 (0.0135) (0.0131) (0.0134) (0.0134) 
Log of Remittances -0.00162 -0.00409 -0.000572 -0.000441 
 (0.00661) (0.00637) (0.00655) (0.00654) 
At least 1 Moved child -0.000735 -0.00301 -0.00288 -0.00312 
 (0.00899) (0.00867) (0.00891) (0.00889) 
At least 1 Moved adult 0.00236 0.0204
*
 -0.00246 -0.00213 
 (0.00830) (0.00809) (0.00824) (0.00825) 
Women’s Education 0.0389
**
 0.0359
**
 0.0225 0.0214 
 (0.0134) (0.0129) (0.0134) (0.0136) 
Wave 2005-06 0.0586
***
 0.00465 0.00686 0.00981 
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 (0.00701) (0.00758) (0.00941) (0.00884) 
Wave 2009-10 -0.0219
***
 -0.0451
***
 -0.0314
***
 -0.0310
***
 
 (0.00565) (0.00564) (0.00571) (0.00571) 
N. adults  -0.0404
***
   
  (0.00257)   
Av. disability   -0.168
***
 -0.166
***
 
   (0.0205) (0.0205) 
Head low ed.    0.0240 
    (0.0128) 
Head primary ed.    0.00163 
    (0.0133) 
Head sec. ed.    -0.00789 
    (0.0153) 
Constant term 0.570
***
 0.759
***
 0.636
***
 0.586
***
 
 (0.0642) (0.0631) (0.0641) (0.0571) 
N 5295 5295 5294 5297 
R
2
 0.074 0.139 0.092 0.093 
adj. R
2
 -0.499 -0.394 -0.470 -0.469 
Standard errors in parentheses
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
 
 
In general, results for idle children are consistent with the ones for school attendance, while 
the ones for child labour are not. Even with all the caveats on the estimation problems, we 
can conclude that the main issue opposing children’s schooling is not children labour, but 
instead children doing nothing. These findings are consistent with the literature.
73
 
Also, there is a confirmation of the previous results on moving: when adults move from the 
household, children’s human capital may be at risk, while if they are the ones moving, they 
are better off. This is due probably to the fact that children are made to move by their 
parents or guardians to areas where they have better access to services and are less exposed 
to dangers and struggle. 
                                                 
73
 See Biggeri, Guarcello, Lyon and Rosati (2003) 
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Table 6.3 – Household rate of idle children -  Linear probability model 
 
 Model A Model B Model C Model D 
Av. Age of children -0.228
***
 -0.227
***
 -0.229
***
 -0.232
***
 
 (0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0176) (0.0173) 
Av. Age of children sq. 0.00968
***
 0.00966
***
 0.00973
***
 0.00988
***
 
 (0.000896) (0.000896) (0.000886) (0.000873) 
Child Gender -0.00846 -0.00922 -0.00391 -0.00678 
 (0.0258) (0.0259) (0.0255) (0.0251) 
Age of head -0.00123 -0.00127 -0.00105  
 (0.00101) (0.00101) (0.001000)  
N. children 0-5 -0.00132 -0.00166 -0.0168
*
 -0.0155
*
 
 (0.00637) (0.00638) (0.00652) (0.00646) 
N. children 6-15 0.0435
***
 0.0439
***
 0.0446
***
 0.0440
***
 
 (0.00490) (0.00493) (0.00484) (0.00480) 
2
nd
 Expenditures Quintile  -0.0411
**
 -0.0415
**
 -0.0371
**
 -0.0373
**
 
 (0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0143) (0.0141) 
3
rd
 Expenditures Quintile  -0.0540
***
 -0.0544
***
 -0.0519
***
 -0.0523
***
 
 (0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0155) (0.0153) 
4
th
 Expenditures Quintile  -0.0937
***
 -0.0944
***
 -0.0881
***
 -0.0885
***
 
 (0.0173) (0.0174) (0.0171) (0.0169) 
5
th
 Expenditures Quintile  -0.0875
***
 -0.0887
***
 -0.0835
***
 -0.0839
***
 
 (0.0205) (0.0206) (0.0203) (0.0200) 
Log of Remittances -0.0107 -0.0105 -0.0128 -0.0112 
 (0.01000) (0.01000) (0.00988) (0.00975) 
At least 1 Moved child -0.0618
***
 -0.0616
***
 -0.0584
***
 -0.0528
***
 
 (0.0137) (0.0137) (0.0135) (0.0133) 
At least 1 Moved adult 0.0221 0.0208 0.0297
*
 0.0333
**
 
 (0.0126) (0.0127) (0.0125) (0.0123) 
Women’s Education -0.0751
***
 -0.0750
***
 -0.0461
*
 -0.0233 
 (0.0204) (0.0204) (0.0204) (0.0206) 
Wave 2005-06 -0.0925
***
 -0.0885
***
 -0.00592 0.00198 
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 (0.0106) (0.0119) (0.0142) (0.0133) 
Wave 2009-10 -0.0437
***
 -0.0420
***
 -0.0281
**
 -0.0199
*
 
 (0.00856) (0.00886) (0.00863) (0.00855) 
N. adults  0.00300   
  (0.00402)   
Av. disability   0.280
***
 0.264
***
 
   (0.0311) (0.0311) 
Head low ed.    0.0145 
    (0.0215) 
Head primary ed.    0.0239 
    (0.0276) 
Head sec. ed.    0.0324 
    (0.0306) 
Constant term 1.515
***
 1.501
***
 1.405
***
 1.344
***
 
 (0.0973) (0.0992) (0.0970) (0.0856) 
N 5208 5208 5207 5159 
R
2
 0.127 0.127 0.148 0.146 
adj. R
2
 -0.414 -0.414 -0.380 -0.393 
Standard errors in parentheses* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 Author's elaboration on UNPS data 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
The present work sought to examine the relationship between family mobility and 
children’s schooling, since the formation of human capital and mobility are both crucial 
issues for development. To this end, Uganda was chosen as a case study, and the analysis 
was carried out using data from the three waves of the Uganda National Panel Survey. 
Household mobility was represented by two dummy variables, one for the mobility of 
children, one for the mobility of adults. School attendance for children aged 6 to 15 was 
analyzed in relation to household characteristics, using an household average model with 
fixed effects, estimated both with linear probability and two-censoring model (the latter 
131 
 
didn’t give significantly different results, though). Estimation results shows that children 
who moved in the five years prior to the survey had a better chance to attend school, while 
children whose parents had moved had a lower probability of attending school. The same 
kind of estimates were repeated also for the completion of the first grade of primary school 
and for the completion of all primary school, but no significant evidence was found for 
mobility. As further robustness check, the analysis was also done using a mixed technique, 
which allows for both individual and household-specific effects. Results were confirmed. It 
seems that for developing countries, the crucial issue is the re-allocation of time, chores and 
supervision inside the household. 
As human capital formation also depends on different factors other than schooling, models 
were also estimated for health and child labour. No significant result was found, and for 
child labour the results were somewhat puzzling in that no factor seemed relevant. Other 
than estimation problems, this could be due to the fact that in poor countries children who 
don’t attend school often don’t work, either. To test this hypothesis, a last estimation was 
run on the probability for a child to be “idle”, i.e. to neither work nor to attend school, and 
the results mirrored the ones found for schooling. Mobility has the opposite effect: children 
moving decrease the probability of being idle, while the reverse is true for adults moving. 
In general, we can say that even if the results of the present work are mixed, they are in line 
with the previous literature for developing countries: if children move, possibly to access 
better areas, the effect of mobility is positive, while the opposite applies when adults move. 
When adults are missing from the household, even if for a limited period of time, the 
effects on children’s school attendance are detrimental.  
This work adds to the literature in that it addresses both adults’ and children’s mobility, 
whose effects were never been studied together. Also, it adds in the investigation of a past 
mobility, which is a different concept from current migration (and absence) of family 
members: the use of a retrospective mobility variable, added to the use of fixed effects 
panel data, makes the results more relevant, since schooling choices have long-term 
consequences. Finally, it adds to the literature in using newly available data, and 
investigating a country seldom studied in this aspect. 
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Further research investigating the effects of mobility on children’s welfare and human 
capital formation is of course needed, as the results are possibly very much context-
specific. 
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